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LIST OF ACTORS
Board of Kmart’s Directors:

The body ultimately responsible for filing
bankruptcy, and writing the plan for
reorganization.

Creditors Committee:

Represented by Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston
& Rosen, P.C. of NY. Co-Counsel is Winston &
Strawn of Chicago IL. The committee's financial
advisor is KMPG LLP. The committee was
appointed January 31, 2002.

Charles Conaway:

Kmart CEO 2000-2001.

ESL Investments:

A hedge fund managed by Edward Lampert, who
has been called the next Warren Buffett, which
specializes in buying distressed organizations.

Equity Committee:

Represented by Traub, Bonacquist & Fox, LLP
of NY. Co-Counsel is Goldberg, Kohn, Bell,
Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd. of Chicago IL.
The committee's advisor was Saybrook
Restructuring Advisors. The committee was
appointed on June 17, 2002.

Financial Advisors:

Miller Buckfire Lewis & Co., LLC and Dresdner
Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc.

Financial Institutions Committee:

Represented by Jones Day of Cleveland OH,
Chicago IL, and Washington DC. The
committee’s advisor was FTI Consulting, Inc.

Joseph Antonini:

Kmart CEO 1987-1995.

Kmart:

As a whole, the company included the following
entities: Kmart Corporation, Kmart Corporation
of Illinois, Inc., Kmart of Indiana, Kmart of
Pennsylvania LP, Kmart of North Carolina LLC,
Kmart of Texas LP, Bluelight.com LLC, Big
Beaver of Florida Development LLC, The
Coolidge Group, n/k/a, TC Group 1 LLC,
Kmart Michigian Property Services, L.L.C.,
4

Kmart Financing 1, Troy CMBS Property L.L.C.,
Big Beaver Development Corporation, Big
Beaver of Guaynabo Development Corporation,
Bluelight.com, Inc., Kmart Holdings Inc., Kmart
of Amsterdam, NY Distribution Center, Inc.,
Kmart Stores of Indiana, Inc. f/k/a Kmart
Logistics Services, Inc., Kmart of Michigian, Inc.,
Kmart Stores of TCNP, Inc., f/k/a Kmart
Trading Services, Inc., Kmart Overseas
Corporation, JAF, Inc., VTA, Inc., Big Beaver of
Caguas Development Corporation II Big Beaver
of Carolina Development Corporation, Kmart
Pharmacies, Inc. Builders Square, Inc., and
Sourcing & Technical Services Inc.
Kmart Creditor Trust:

The entity the plan implemented to oversee
unsecured creditors’ claims against Kmart.

Mark Schwartz:

Kmart President 2000-2001.

Plan investors:

ESL & Third Avenue Trust.

Restructuring Advisors:

Alix partners LLC.

Sebastian S. Kresge:

Founder of Kmart.

Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher &Flom:

Counsel for Kmart.

John William Butler, Jr.

1

“Jack Butler co-leads Skadden’s global Corporate
Restructuring practice, which works to provide
innovative, practical legal solutions to clients
involved in distressed company situations…. In
December 2010, Mr. Butler was one of 10 lawyers
profiled for delivering “creative solutions” to
clients during the credit crisis in the Financial
Times’ inaugural “U.S. Innovative Lawyers”
report, where the firm ranked first nationwide for
innovation and received top rankings in corporate
restructuring, M&A and financial services.” 1

http://www.skadden.com/index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=695
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J. Eric Ivester

“J. Eric Ivester represents clients in business
reorganizations, acquisitions and divestitures. Mr.
Ivester has represented debtors, creditors,
investors, sellers, purchasers and other financial
advisors in all stages of complex restructuring
transactions, from Chapter 11 reorganizations to
out-of-court
negotiations,
workouts
and
2
divestitures.”

Mark A. McDermott

“Mark McDermott represents public and private
corporations and their principal stakeholders in
troubled company M&A, restructuring and
financing transactions. He has represented
corporations in out-of-court restructurings,
prepackaged and prearranged Chapter 11 cases,
and traditional Chapter 11 cases….Mr.
McDermott recently was named one of America’s
“Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers” by
Turnarounds & Workouts magazine. He also was
named to the Euromoney and Legal Media Group’s
2009 Expert Guide to the World’s Leading Insolvency
and Restructuring Lawyers.” 3

Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby:

The judge of the bankruptcy court. She earned
her B.A. from the University of Illinois in 1969
and graduated with a J.D. from The John
Marshall School of Law in 1973. She was
originally appointed for a fourteen year term as a
bankruptcy judge in the Northern District of
Illinois in 1986. She was elevated to Chief
Bankruptcy Judge in 1998 and re-appointed by
the Seventh Circuit in 1999. Her current term
expires in 2014.

Subsidiaries:

The 37 affiliated debtors who are owned by
Kmart Corporation but are legally separate
identities.

2

http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=704
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http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=2197
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Unsecured Creditors’ Committee:

The body that represents all the unsecured
creditors’ claims.
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KEY TERMS
Automatic Stay:

Provides legal protection to debtors. Found in
Bankruptcy Code §362. In short, it bars most
creditor actions to enforce prepetition obligations
or debts owed by a debtor and allows the Debtor
to continue to operate while reorganizing.

Bankruptcy Court:

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division).

Critical Vendors:

Vendors which Kmart regarded as essential to the
success of the reorganization.

DIP Financing:

A loan provided to Kmart to support continued
operations during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case. Kmart received approximately
$2 billion dollars in DIP Financing.

Disclosure Statement:

A written statement by Kmart providing
sufficient information to enable relevant investors
to make informed decisions about the plan.

Effective Date:

The date that the plan of reorganization went into
effect and the automatic stay is lifted.

New Holding Company:

A successor corporation created pursuant to the
terms of the Plan of Reorganization. After the
plan was approved, The New Holding Company
changed its name back to “Kmart Holdings.”

New Operating Company

An intermediary company that houses upper-level
management of the reorganized enterprise that
will in turn own, directly or indirectly, various
corporate and other entities that will own and
operate the business of reorganized Kmart.

Petition Date:

January 22, 2002: the date Kmart filed its
bankruptcy petition.

8

Plan of Reorganization:

The findings of fact and conclusions of law which
detailed the future rights and obligations of the
reorganized Kmart.
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Chapter One
THE RISE OF KMART
Rule No. 1: Never lose money. Rule No. 2: Never forget rule No. 1.
Warren Buffett
The American Dream is the belief that a person can go from dirt poor to filthy rich in
a single lifetime. This dream is the aspiration of millions, but it is only realized by a select
few. The stories of those who have lived the American Dream, such as the Rockefellers and
Carnegies, have been passed down in hagiographic detail. A less known story is that of
Sebastian S. Kresge, the founder of Kmart. In 1897 he started a five and ten cent store with
an $8,000 loan, and he incorporated S.S. Kresge
on March 9, 1912. By 1924, he had a personal
worth of $5,000,000,000 in 2009 US dollars.
Under

the

leadership

of

the

company’s

president, Harry Cunningham, the first Kmart
store was opened in 1962. 4 Kmart’s growth was
In 1957, S. S. Kresge leads his team around the
swimming pool on his 26 acre estate. Co-author Jon
Fisher’s great-grandfather is the fifth person from
the right.

explosive. For example, 271 Kmart stores were
opened in 1976 alone. 5

By the 1980’s, Kmart was a retail giant, and the company was ready to use its financial
power to support new ventures. In 1984, Kmart acquired Walden Book Company and
Home Centers of America. In 1990, it purchased Sports Authority. In 1991, it became the

4
5

International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
Id.
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controlling partner in OfficeMax when it acquired 91% of the company. In 1992, Kmart
purchased Boarders Books.6
By 1995, Kmart was the world’s fifteenth largest corporation. The company’s gross
sales totaled $34,313,000,000 and resulted in a profit of $2,960,000,000. 7 By early 2002,
Kmart was nation’s second largest discount retailer8 and the third largest general merchandise
retailer.9 Kmart operated 2,114 stores, including 136 supercenters, with locations in each of
the 50 United States, Puerto Rico, U. S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. 10 Kmart’s retail
operations were located in 308 of the 324 metropolitan statistical areas in the nation. Kmart
had relationships with more than 4,000 merchants worldwide and had more than 5,000
leases and subleases with 3,240 landlords and subtenants. Kmart had over 6,300 executory
contracts and employed approximately 234,000 people on a payroll of 5 billion dollars in
salaries and benefits.11
Kmart’s success was based on two main strengths: buying power and brand
awareness.12 First, the size of the company allowed it to buy goods cheaply and in bulk. For
more than a decade, Kmart had over 30 billion in net sales and contracted with over 4,000

These acquisitions would later prove to be financial failures. See Chapter Two.
International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
8 Wal-Mart was the largest discount retailer.
9 Wal-Mart was first, and Target was second.
10 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 7 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL)
11 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 7 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL)
12 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
6
7
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merchants. Kmart was able to acquire exclusive brand rights for national prominent goods
such as: Martha Stewart Living, Jaclyn Smith, Kathy Ireland, Disney non-character apparel
for infants and children, Joe Boxer, and Route 66. 13 Second, Kmart’s rapid expansion
provided universal brand awareness. Over 95% of Americans lived within 15 miles of a
Kmart. Further, Kmart had circulars that reached into over 70 homes and a steady flow of
e-commerce on its company website. 14 Sebastian Kresge’s company was living the American
Dream.

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
13

14

Id at 6.
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Chapter Two
CIRCLING THE WAGONS: KMART BEGINS TO SLIP
“Think of Kmart as a sick uncle. He has been coughing and wheezing for years. Now he has to have major
surgery. We hope he survives the knife. But he will never be what he once was. "
Tom Walsh, Free Press Columnist, January 2002.
Like all good things, Kmart’s rise to power eventually came to an end. Kmart’s
demise was caused by three main factors. First, Kmart failed to develop a consistent
company philosophy. Second, Kmart developed a corporate culture with low levels of
management accountability and high levels of compensation. Third, Kmart was simply
unable to compete with Wal-Mart. In particular, Wal-Mart bested Kmart with superior
supply chain development and management, revenue, and product turnover.
A.

Kmart is different from Wal-Mart and Target

One of Kmart’s central problems was the lack of a coherent corporate philosophy.In
the early 2000’s, Kmart was awkwardly positioned between Target, which was known for
reasonably priced style, and Wal-Mart, which was known for rock bottom prices. In an
attempt to compete on a different plane, Kmart experimented with investments in other
companies, such as Office Max, Walden Books, and Sports Authority. 15 However, Kmart
did not develop these assets, and soon abandoned its investments. 16
B.

Corporate Payments

At the same time that Kmart was struggling to find its identity, Kmart’s corporate
officers feasted on a tradition of expensive perks. For instance, Joseph Antonini, Kmart’s
15
16

See Chapter 1.
International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
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Chairman and CEO from 1987-1995, traveled luxuriously with the choice of five corporate
jetseven as the fortunes of the company began to decline 17 Further, Mr. Antionini
complacently ignored technological advancements. For instance, he was proud that he never
used an Automated Teller Machine, and he used an assistant to print his email. The
corporation as a whole did not begin to use videoconferencing until the 2000’s.18
By the time that Kmart filed for bankruptcy, corporate compensation was high.
Charles Conaway, the Chairman and CEO of Kmart at the beginning of 2002, collected
nearly $23 million in compensation over
the period of 11 months.
months

before

Kmart

Several
filed

for

bankruptcy, he received a $5 million
retention loan. 19 He lived in a 29-room
mansion and billed Kmart $523,000 in
“temporary housing and living costs.”
His original contract provided him $1.4

Conaway’s “temporary housing”

million in annual salary, $6 million in up-front cash and stock bonuses, and a restricted stock
award6 worth $5.4 million. 20 Despite this approximately $12 million in salary for one year

By comparison, Wal-Mart’s only aircraft was a two-seat propeller aircraft that Sam Walton flew himself. While this is
a limited snapshot of the men in charge at their respective companies, it illustrates the broad principal that Kmart was
will to splurge into excess and Wal-Mart really believed in its “save more” philosophy. See Robert Dickie, Financial
Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 158 (ABA 2002).
18 Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 136 (John Wiley & Sons Inc.
2003).
19 Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002.
20 By comparison, the previous CE Floyd Hall, earned approximately $3 million in salary and bonuses in 1999.
17
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worth of work, Conway was also promised an additional $15 million in cash and stock
payments to cover “foregone compensation” from his previous employer.
Mark Schwartz, the president of Kmart at the beginning of 2002, was also given
enormous sums of money for driving the company to the brink of bankruptcy. Over 16
months, he made $10.8 million, including $4 million in retention bonuses and $1.4 million in
unspecified housing costs. As well, Kmart paid him $2.4 million in 2001 to reimburse him
for his income taxes. 21 The payments made to Schwartz and Conway are summarized on
the following chart.

Despite receiving personal fortunes, Schwartz and Conway also added luxury to the
lives of other company executives. They purchased two corporate jets to add to Kmart’s
fleet and approved a program that awardedexecutives with Jaguars and Land Rovers as their
company cars. Besides these company programs, the pair also authorized over $20 million
21

Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002.
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in retention loans to 23 other Kmart executives ranging in amount from $300,000 to $3
million. 22 Charles Conway stated at his first annual meeting that Kmart was going to “close
the gap” on Target and Wal-Mart. 23
C.

Kmart vs. Wal-Mart

Without a coherent, distinguishing corporate philosophy, Kmart was unable to
compete with the rise of Wal-Mart during 1988, Kmart was larger than Wal-Mart and earned
higher revenues: Wal-Mart had net income of $627 million on $16 billion in revenues,
whereas Kmart had a net income of $692 million on $26 billion in revenue. 24 By 1994,
however, Wal-Mart had earnings of $2.3 billion and revenue of $68 billion, while Kmart had
a $1 billion loss and revenues of $28 billion. 25
Kmart’s demise at the hands of Wal-Mart was caused by three main weaknesses.
First, Wal-Mart developed more effective supply chains. Second, Wal-Mart developed a
higher revenue stream. Third, Wal-Mart experienced a much higher turnover of inventory.
i.

Supply Chain

Wal-Mart’s central strength was its well-constructed supply chains. Wal-Mart had
almost no supply storage areas because its vendor-managed inventory system made suppliers
responsible for delivering product exactly when it was needed. Wal-Mart’s system was
known as “just in time” inventory management.26

Kmart’s road to bankruptcy Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. Bill Vlasic, Mark Truby, & David Shepardson
“My commitment is within 720 days to get the business fixed structurally and culturally… we’re definitely on track.” 24
Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 157 (ABA 2002).
25 Id.
26 Now in Bankruptcy, Kmart struggled with supply chain Steve Konicki, information week, Jan 28, 2002
22
23
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In contrast, at Kmart it was not unusual for a supplier's sales representative to find
shelves empty but products piled up in stockrooms. Even major brands such as Martha
Stewart were not supplied properly. 27
As well, Kmart’s management simply refused to utilize supply chain technology even
as it was embraced by Wal-Mart.For instance, Kmarthada contract with i2 Technologies Inc.
regarding logistics-monitoring and transportation-management software as well as a custom
version of TradeMatrix supply-chain software. But after signing the contract, Kmart decided
to write off the $130 million dollar investment and not implement any changes until it
reengineered its business structure. 28
ii.

Revenue Stream & Overhead

In 1988, Kmart spent $0.231 in overhead for every dollar earned, but Wal-Mart only
spent $0.163. Naturally, this allowed Wal-Mart to have lower prices and higher profits. In
part because of lower pricing, Wal-Mart was able to outgrow Kmart. 29
From 1996 to 2002 Kmart’s sales increased 14.2% and its sales per square foot
increased 27.7% to $235. 30 During 2002, however, Kmart was deep into the red and posted
losses of $3.2 billion. Part of the reason why Kmart’s growth was insufficient to keep it in
the black was the intense pressure it was facing from Wal-Mart. During the same 1996-2002
time period, Wal-Mart increased its sale per square foot by 30.9% from $311 to $407. At the
Even Martha complained of distribution problems and the difficulty customers had locating her products. For
such customers, she said, "If you are frustrated, keep looking."
28 Steve Konicki, Now In Bankruptcy, Kmart Struggled With Supply Chain, Information Week, Jan. 28, 2002, at 13.
29 Kmart was growing at 9% a year, while Wal-Mart was growing at 40% a year.
30 Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 163 (ABA 2002).
27
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time Kmart filed for bankruptcy, Wal-Mart made $172 per year more than Kmart per square
foot of store.
From 1991 to 2002, Kmart increased its revenues from $24.9 billion to $36.2 billion,
an increase of 45%, 31 but Wal-Mart increased its revenues more than five-fold.

As well,

Wal-Mart was able to supply goods cheaper and faster than Kmart. 32
iii.

Asset Turnover

The asset turnover of a store is the amount of sales revenue generated for every
dollar's worth of assets. In general, discount realtors such as Wal-Mart and Kmart strive to
have a high asset turnover. In 2002, Kmart had an asset turnover of 4.9. 33 In contrast, WalMart’s turnover was 6.6. Thus, in terms of volume increases and the ability to spread costs
over more sales, Kmart was simply unable to compete with Wal-Mart. 34
In conclusion, it was evident to Kmart that the company was losing ground to WalMart throughout the 90’s and early 2000’s. Unable to compete with Wal-Mart on prices,
Kmart began to look into cutting its fixed costs. Kmart determined that, to remain
competitive with Wal-Mart, fixed costs would have to be cut by $347 million (9%). Despite
the efforts of management, Kmart simply lacked the necessary logistics expertise, the sales
volume, and the management commitment to achieve this kind of cut. 35 Even if Kmart

When adjusted for inflation, Kmart’s increase in revenue was 11%.
Id.
33 The rate Wal-Mart had in 1991.
34 Id.
35 Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 164 (ABA 2002).
31

32
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could make the necessary cuts, it still lacked the facilities needed to generate the necessary
sales and could not afford to build new stores. 36

36

Id. at 165
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Chapter Three
BLUE LIGHT ALWAYS VS. EVERYDAY LOW PRICES
“It takes as much imagination to create debt as to create income.”
Leonard Orr
In an effort to restore the fortunes of the company and find a way to compete with
Wal-Mart, Kmart hired Charles Conaway as the new CEO. 37 Conaway decided that Kmart
should return to its roots and become the nation’s number one low-priced realtor. To
implement this plan, Conaway decided to implement drastic price cuts in an attempt to lure
customers from Wal-Mart. This decision had disastrous results.
To implement Conaway’s new plan, Kmart began the “blue-light always” campaign. 38
The company planned to put 50,000 items on sale nationwide. This signaled a major change
in retail strategy for Kmart. 39
The new program was not supported by Kmart’s board or by their vendors. The
board of directors did not approve of the program and wanted a trial-run before it began.
Further, Kmart did not even consult with its suppliers to get their feedback or ask for their
support. 40 Despite the lack of support, Conaway moved forward with the program.

Conaway was the former president and COO of CVS, the second largest pharmacy chain in the United States.
International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
38 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
39 The traditional strategy was a promotion-driven business model where Kmart would offer numerous items highly
discounted prices in the hopes when shoppers came in, they would buy other items.
40 Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 157 (John Wiley & Sons Inc.
2003).
37
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This maneuver proved to be a critical mistake. Not only did Wal-Mart move quickly
and ruthlessly to match or undercut Kmart’s lowered prices, but Kmart also compounded its
mistake by simultaneously cutting back its distribution of expensive advertising circulars.
Customers, accustomed to receiving the advertising in the Sunday paper, simply stopped
shopping. Same-store sales fell throughout the final months of 2001, including during the
crucial holiday selling season. 41
In short, Kmart could not match Wal-Mart on price, could not increase its sales
enough to cover its costs, and could not cut its overhead enough break even. 42 In 1991
Kmart had a market capitalization of $8.6 billion. As of 2002, Kmart’s market capitalization
was reduced to a mere $200 million, a destruction of 98% of its value. 43

Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 157 (John Wiley & Sons Inc.
2003).
42Id.
43 Id.
41
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Chapter Four
DEBT IS A FOUR LETTER WORD
“Buy what thou hast no Need of and ere long thou shalt sell thy Necessaries.”
Benjamin Franklin
Like a consumer who solves financial difficulties by signing up for a new credit card,
Kmart soon found itself buried in debt obligations. Kmart entered into a three-year credit
agreement 44 on December 6, 1999 that provided it with a revolving facility of $1.1 billion. 45
On November 13, 2001, Kmart entered into a one year agreement with various lenders 46
that extended it $400 million on a revolving credit basis. 47

In 2002, Kmart owed

approximately $2.1 billion in principal under unsecured indentures 48 to the Bank of New
York. On November 1, 1994, Kmart was also a party to commercial development revenue
refunding bond indentures 49with an outstanding principal balance of $1.8 million.
In the late 80’s and early 90’s, Kmart acquired several companies only to abandon
them a few years later. 50 When Kmart later sold these companies, it did so at a loss and
Held by Chase Securities Inc., JP Morgan Securities, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Bank Boston N.S.
and Bank of New York.
45 As of the petition date, Kmart owed the fund $813 million. Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint
Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 10 , In re Kmart
Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).
46 Id.
47 By 2002, Kmart was indebted $393 million to its lenders plus accrued interest and applicable costs, expenses, and
fees. Id.
48 An indenture is a written agreement between the issuer of a bond and the bondholders which specifies the interest
rate, maturity date, and convertibility. In essence, an unsecured indentured is simply an unsecured bond.
49 Id.
50 These companies included The Sports Authority, Borders, and Office Max. See Chapter One.
44
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remained obligated to the debt incurred in these leveraged acquisition transactions. As of
early 2002, Kmart owed $70 million in industrial revenue bonds and was indebted to lease
agreements that had a present value of $314 million. 51
In sum, Kmart was heavily indebted on a three-year loan it received in 1999. When it
became obvious that it could not meet its financial obligations, it acquired a new loan for a
single year in the hopes of turning the corner and getting back into the black. After Kmart
performed poorly in the 4th quarter of 2001, a critical quarter for retailers, it was boxed in. It
could not afford to pay its loans, debt obligations, or its creditors. 52

Over the full life of the leases, the value would balloon out to $519 million. Id.
The total debt to equity (D/E) ratio is a comparison between a company’s combined long and short-term debt to
shareholders’ equity, or book value. The D/E ratio is 1.0 when debt equals equity, and high debt companies have
higher D/E ratios than low debt companies. Kmart using the discount retailer’s January 2001 fiscal year report, ($8
share price), and again using its October 2001 quarterly report, ($7). Kmart’s January 2001 D/E of 0.5 put it only
marginally into the high-debt category, its October D/E ratio was .8. See Disclosure Statement with Respect to First
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at
8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).
51

52
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Chapter Five
THE BEGINNING OF THE END
How did you go bankrupt? Gradually, then suddenly.
Ernest Hemingway
For Fiscal Year 2001, Kmart had gross sales of approximately 36 billion, administered
14. 3 billion in assets and had outstanding liabilities of 10 billion dollars. However, declining
sales had resulted in a liquidity crisis. 53 Furthermore, major vendors were beginning to halt
shipments of goods. 54 On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies, Kmart’s sole grocery
provider, sent the management of Kmart a letter stating that it would be halting all
shipments to Kmart stores. Later that day, Kmart’s board voted to file for relief under
chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 55
Although Kmart’s bankruptcy was likely inevitable, two factors probably contributed
to Kmart’s filing on January 22, 2002. First, Kmart had already begun talks with potential
financers. By late January, Kmart had secured promises for $2 billion in post-petition
financing. 56 Second, Kmart was facing increasing demands from its vendors. Declining
sales had resulted in a liquidity crisis, and major vendors were beginning to halt shipments of

4th quarter sales were substantially lower than expected and Kmart did not have cash on hand to pay its obligations
on its loans.
54 Fleming wanted.
55 Constance L. Hays, Big Grocery Supplier Files for Bankruptcy Protection (NYT, April 2, 2003). Fleming itself was
forced to file for bankruptcy about a year later when Kmart cut off its distribution arrangement with Fleming. Id.
56 Id.
53
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goods. 57 On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies, Kmart’s sole grocery provider, sent the
management of Kmart a letter stating that it would be halting all shipments to Kmart stores.
Later that day, Kmart’s board voted to file for relief under chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. 58

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).
58 Constance L. Hays, Big Grocery Supplier Files for Bankruptcy Protection (NYT, April 2, 2003). Fleming itself
was forced to file for bankruptcy about a year later when Kmart cut off its distribution arrangement with Fleming. Id.
57
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Chapter Six
BLACK FRIDAY
You owe me ten shillings,
Say the bells of St. Helen’s.
When will you pay me?
Say the bells of Old Bailey.
When I grow rich,
Say the bells of Shoreditch.
Pray when will that be?
Say the bells of Stephney.
I am sure I don’t know,
Says the great bell at Bow…
Here comes a candle to light you to bed,
Here comes a chopper to cut off your head.
Nursery Rhyme
The previous chapters have summarized the events that brought Kmart to the brink
of bankruptcy in the beginning of 2002. Unable to find a solution to its financial difficulties,
Kmart filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Friday, January 22, 2002 in
the Northern District of Illinois. The case was assigned to Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby. 59
A.

Kmart’s Story

It is likely that Kmart was brought to the brink of bankruptcy by corporate
mismanagement, the lack of a company philosophy, and a failed price war with Wal-Mart. 60
Unsurprisingly, this was not the story that Kmart presented to the bankruptcy court.
According to Kmart, the company needed to file for bankruptcy protection in 2002 due to
circumstances largely out of its control. Kmart asserted that Wal-Mart and Target had
provided significant competition in the years leading up to the bankruptcy. Additionally, the
59
60

See List of Characters.
See Chapter Four.
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company argued, the market forces were to blame, including “the evaporation of the surety
bond market, and an erosion of supplier confidence, as well as intense competition in the
discount retailing industry, unsuccessful sales and marketing initiatives, the continuing
recession, and recent capital market volatility.” 61
Despite the market limitations claimed by Kmart, the company was still an industry
leader in discount retailing.

Through reorganization, Kmart hoped to “improve

[its]operating performance and to realize significant cost savings. 62 Kmart intended to use
the restructuring process to bring its debt in line with its cash flow generating capability and
competitors. Kmart felt that the reorganization “should create financial flexibility for future
operating requirements and capital expenditures and improve liquidity.” 63
B.

First Day Motions

Like all Chapter 11 bankruptcies, Kmart’s started with a flurry of activity. On the
first day, Tuesday, January 22, 2002, Kmart filed twenty-three motions. 64 Many of these
Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii)
Authorizing
the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, Filed Jan. 22, 2002.
62 Id.
63 Id.The goals of reorganization listed in the first day motions are vague. There are at least two explanations for this: (1)
the first day motion was badly written; (2) Kmart really didn’t any clear reorganization strategy beyond shedding debt
through bankruptcy.The second option is more likely. See Chapter Thirteen.
64 Kmart’s motions included: MOTION for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Mail Initial Notices in Lieu Providing
a Mailing Matrix Required under Local Rules; MOTION for an Order Granting Extension of Time to File Schedules
and Statements; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.102 and 105[a], Bankruptcy Rules 2002[m] and 9007, and
Local Rules 101, 400, and 402 Establishing Omnibus Hearing Dates and Certain Notice, Case Management and
Administrative Procedures; MOTION for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] and 331 Establishing
Procedures for Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Professionals; MOTION for an Order Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. 105[a]327[a]and 331 Authorizing Retention of Professionals Utilized by Debtors in the Ordinary Course of
Business; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105, 345 and 363 Authorizing [A] Continued Maintenance of
Existing Bank Accounts, [B] Continued Use of Existing Cash Management System, [C] Continued use of Existing
Business Forms, [D] Continuation of Intercompany Transactions with Non-Debtor Subsidiaries and Affiliates, and [E]
Waiving Investment and Deposit Requirements; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a],365 and 507[a][6].
61
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were ruled upon a mere three days later. This section will be divided into two parts. First, the
traditional foundations for first day motions will be examined. Second, several of the typical
first day motions filed by Kmart will be summarized.
i.

Traditional Foundations for First Day Motions

Under the bankruptcy code, the general rule is that a debtor cannot pay the prepetition claims of a creditor. 65 First day critical vendor and employee wage payment orders
and the like evolved as exceptions to this rule. A typical first day motion in general allows

Authorizing Continuation of Certain Customer Practices; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 365[a] Authorizing the
Debtors to Assume Certain Services Agreement with Non-Executive Chairman; MOTION for Order [i] Authorizing
the Debtors to Pay Pre-petition Wages, Saleries, and Employee Benefits,[ii] Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the
Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and [iii] Directing All Banks to Honor Pre-petition
Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 105[a]363[b][1] and
363[a] Authorizing Debtors to Implement a Key Employee Retention Plan; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 265[a]
Authorizing the Debtors to Assume Certain Employment Agreements with Senior Management Employees; MOTION
for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a],366 503m and 507 of the Bankruptcy Code [1]Prohibiting Utilities from
Alteringm, Refusing or Discounting Servcies on Account of Pre-petition Invoices and [11]Establishing Procedures for
Determining Requests for Additional Assurance; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105 Authorizing
Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Consignment Vendors and Customer Service Providers and Approving Procedures
Concerning Consigned Goods; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 105[a] Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition
Claims of Certain Critical Trade Vendors; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a],541,and 507[a][8]
Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Pre-petition Sales, Use, Trust Fund and Other Taxes and Related Obligations;
MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] Authorizing Payment of Certain Pre-petition Shipping and
Delivery Charges; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363 and 546[g] Authorizing Debtors to Implement a
Vendor Return Program and Granting Related Relief; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a],503[b] and
546[b] Authorizing Payment of Contractors and Service Providers in Satisfaction of Liens; MOTION for Order
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a]and 363 Authorizing Payment of Pre-petition Obligations Necessary to Obtain Imported
Merchandise; MOTION Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105,362,503 and 546 for entry of Interim and Final Orders [1] Providing
Administrative Expense Treatment for certain Holders of Valid Reclamation Claims and [11] Establishing Procedures
for Resolutions and Payment of Reclamation Claims; MOTION for Entry of Interim and Final Orders [1] Providing
Administrative Expense Treatment for Paca and Pasa Trust Claims Procedures and [11] Establishing Procedures for
Resolutions and Payment of Paca and Pasa Claims; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] and 365[a]
Authorizing [A] Rejection of Certain Unexplained Real Estate Leases and [B] Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other
Unexpired Leases; and MOTION for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105,361,362,364[c][2] and 364[c][3]. See Docket Report.
Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain “Critical
Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005).
65
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the debtor to avoid complying with one or more requirements of the bankruptcy code. 66 A
significant sub-category of first day order are those that allow payments of prepetition claims
immediately, without confirmation of a plan of reorganization, in the case of, for example,
“critical” vendors and employees that largely fund their lives paycheck-to-paycheck.
The first debtors to propose first day orders were railroads under the prior
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which, as amended, remained the law until it was replaced by the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, effective 1979. 67 The railroads claimed that their successful
reorganization was essential to the public interest, and so public policy justified the payment
of some pre-petition claims to ensure that the employees, employers, and vendors associated
with the railroad were supportive of the reorganization. 68 The practice of allowing these
payments became known as the “Doctrine of Necessity,” and the bounds of the doctrine
were not clearly defined. And perhaps clear definition was not necessary or desirable to
those that championed the doctrine’s use and development. When the typical railroad
organization case involved hundreds of millions of dollars, the distribution of a few
thousand via first day orders was not a matter of much concern. 69
The use of first day orders spread swiftly to non-railroad cases. They claimed that the
court should allow pre-petition claims because “the debtor relies on certain vendors for
critical products and services, and unless the debtor is permitted to pay its pre-petition debts
66 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005).
67 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005).
68 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005).
69 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (961) (2010).
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to these essential vendors, they likely will stop supplying the debtor, and the debtor’s
chances of successfully reorganizing will be impaired.” 70

The practice spread and,

eventually, first day orders were increasingly applied to all cases, irrespective of size, as a
matter of course. 71 Courts gradually interpreted the railroad “Doctrine of Necessity” to be
incorporated by the Bankruptcy code through 11 U. S. C. §105(a), the “all writs” statute,
which states in part that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”
First day orders became standard in bankruptcies, even as the size of the payments of
pre-petition debts grew in size, and many judges granted them as a matter of course.
Perhaps some judges granted the motions because they rarely meet with firm opposition as
they are filed before the creditor’s committee is formed. Further, “judges are unlikely to
push back out of the fear of being “labeled ‘toxic judges’ and find themselves out of the
business of hearing large Chapter 11 cases.” 72 Regardless of the reason, first day orders
became standard in bankruptcies, even as the size of the payments of pre-petition debts grew
in size. 73
ii.

Typical First Day Motions

It is in this context, in which first day orders were granted as a matter of course, that
Kmart filed its first day motions. Kmart filed many motions, including a request to employ

Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart, Am. Bankr. Inst.
J., 2003 ABIJNL. LEXIS 100, at *9-*10.
71 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (961) (2010).
72 See id.at 977.
73 See id.
70
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Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 74 and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 75 permission to
continue customer practices (such as honoring gift certificates and warranties), 76 permission
to pay employee wages and benefits, 77 permission to pay the expenses of professionals, 78 and
permission to pay pre-petition debts to certain “critical vendors.” 79 For the purposes of
illustration, this paper will analyze (1) the motion to pay employee wages and benefits, (2)
the motion to permission to pay the expenses of professionals, (3) the motion to obtain DIP
financing, and (4) the motion to pay “critical vendors.” These motions were chosen either
because they represented the typical first day motions raised by Kmart or because their
outcome became particularly significant for later cases.
1.

Motion for Order Authorizing Payment of Pre-Petition
Employee Wages and Benefits

As one of their first day motions, Kmart moved the court to enter an order
“authorizing the Debtors to (a) pay the various pre-petition claims of the Debtor’s
employees and independent contractors…and (b) continue the Debtors’ various Employee

Application for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329 Authorizing the Employment and Retention of
Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher &Flom (Illinois) and Affiliated Law Practice Entities as Attorneys for the Debtors (Filed
Jan. 22, 2002). See also, Cast of Characters.
74

75 Application Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) For Order Under Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
Authorizing the Employemnt and Retention of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Financial Advisors to the Debtors
(Filed Jan 22, 2002).See also, Cast of Characters.

Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 365 and 507(a)(6) Authorizing Continuation of Certain
Customer Practices (Filed Jan. 22, 2002).
76

Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii)
Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and
(iii)Directing All banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, 7 (Filed Jan.
22, 2002).

77

78

Motion for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331 Establishing Procedures for Interim

Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, 11 (Filed Jan 22, 2002).
79

Cite.
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benefit plans and programs.” 80 The average monthly payroll for Kmart’s 242,000 employees
was $342.9 million. At the time of filing, approximately $43.0 million remained due for
salaried employees, and $159.2 million was due to hourly employees. 81
At the time of Kmart’s chapter 11 filing, Sections 507(a)(3) and 507(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code required that the priority claims of each employee would be limited to
$4,650 in pre-petition wages and benefits. 82 Kmart estimated that 97% of its workforce met
this category. 83 However, Kmart did not provide more than an estimate, stating that “it is
difficult for the Debtors to know the exact amount due each Employee for the pre-petition
period.” 84
To the degree that Kmart’s requests exceeded the statutory priority limits of the
Bankruptcy Code, they still claimed that the payments were justified under section
105. 85Kmart noted that “[n]umerous courts have used their section 105(a) powers under the
‘doctrine of necessity’ to authorize payment of a debtor-in-possession’s pre-petition

Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii)
Authorizing
the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, 7 (Filed Jan. 22, 2002).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 28.
83 Id. at 9.
84 Id. at 28. This statement is confusing. Kmart is asking for money to pay its employees, but then it is claiming that it
doesn’t know exactly how much it needs to pay. Once the court granted Kmart’s motion, it seems likely that Kmart
calculated the exact amount necessary to pay each employee before cutting the check. It is not clear why Kmart did
not perform this analysis for the court. Perhaps, Kmart just assumed that the motion would be summarily granted, and
that any attempt to pinpoint exact numbers would be unnecessary.
85 Id. at 30.
80
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obligations where, as here, such payment is an essential element of the preservation of the
debtor-in-possession’s potential for rehabilitation.” 86
As with all of its first day motions, Kmart supported the motion to pay employee
wages with an affidavit of Charles Conaway. Conaway’s testimony is detailed, and it directly
states all of the facts alleged in the motion. 87
An order was entered by the court approving the motion on January 25, 2002. 88
2.

Motion for the Payment of Expenses of Professionals

Another typical first day motion is a request to establish procedures for the interim
payment of professionals. Although reading the code literally would suggest that
professionals would wait until the end of the case – or at least for 120 day periods – to seek
approval of and receive payment of their fees and reimbursable expenses, professionals are
actually allowed to collect interim fees, generally subject to a retainage arrangement, like one
used in construction contracts, during the course of the bankruptcy. 89 As the lawyers in
Kmart were likely to incur large amounts of fees and expenses and were unwilling to provide
their services on credit, on the first day of the bankruptcy case they filed a motion requesting
the permission to pay the professionals involved in the bankruptcy. The motion cited
Section 331 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows professionals to apply for relief every 120

86

Id. at 31-32.

87See,

Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, 44
(filed Jan. 22, 2002).
Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) Authorizing the
Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations (Filed Jan 25, 2002).
88

Jonathan P. Friedland, Michael L. Bernstein, George W. Kuney, & John D. Ayer, Chapter 11 – 101, The Nuts and Bolts
of Chapter 11 Practice: a primer, 246 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007).
89

33

days, or more often if the court permits.

Kmart requested monthly payment of all

professionals. Under Kmart’s requested procedure, each professional would submit a
detailed monthly statement of services rendered and expenses incurred. If there was no
objection, Kmart would pay ninety-percent of the bill for fees with a ten percent holdback,
and one hundred percent of disbursements for the month. Kmart proposed that these
payments would be “subject to the Court’s subsequent approval as part of the normal
interim fee application process approximately every 120 days. 90
As legal support for its motion, Kmart noted that “[s]imilar procedures for
compensating and reimbursing court-approved professionals have been established in other
large chapter 11 cases…. Such procedures are needed to avoid professionals funding the
reorganization case.” Of course, Kmart also cited the talismanic Section 105, although it did
not explore its relation to this request in any detail. 91
The court entered an order approving this motion on January 25, 2002. 92
3.

DIP Financing

Although the filing of the bankruptcy provided with some breathing room regarding
pre-petition creditors, Kmart still needed to continue operations as usual if the
reorganization was to succeed. Unsurprisingly, Kmart did not have enough cash on hand to

Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) Authorizing the
Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations (Filed Jan 25, 2002).
90

Motion for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331 Establishing Procedures for Interim
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, 11 (Filed Jan 22, 2002). It is likely that Kmart
thought that this motion would be summarily granted and that extensive support was not necessary. See footnote 55.

91

Interim Order Authorizing PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Financial Advisors for the Debtors and Debtors in
Possession (Entered Jan. 25, 2002).

92
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fund the completion of the restructuring process. Therefore, Kmart concluded that it was
necessary to obtain a firm commitment for post-petition financing at the outset of its case. 93
Kmart requested permission to obtain post-petition financing from JPMorgan Chase
Bank and a syndicate of financial institutions (the “Post-petition Lenders”) up to the amount
of $2 billion. Under section 364(c)(1), Kmart moved to grant the Post-petition Lenders: (1)
superpriority claim status; (2) perfected first priority liens on all unencumbered pre-petition
and post-petition property; and (3) perfected junior security interests and liens on all prepetition and post-petition property subject to valid, perfected, and non-avoidable liens. 94
Kmart was not able to procure the required post-petition financing in the form of
unsecured credit or unsecured debt with an administrative priority, primarily because of the
large amount of funds required by Kmart during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. 95
Therefore, Kmart determined “in their sound business judgment” that the best option was
the following:
• JPM Chase Bank, Fleet Retail, CSFB and GCC committed to provide $500
million each;
• Kmart agreed to pay the underwriting fees;
Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
94 Motion for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing Pursuant to 11. U.S.C. § §
105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2) and 364(c)(3) Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c) (filed
Jan. 22, 2002). Kmart does not appear to support this statement with anything more than the affidavit of Conaway. See
Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
95 Motion for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing Pursuant to 11. U.S.C. § §
105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2) and 364(c)(3) Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c) (filed
Jan. 22, 2002). Kmart does not appear to support this statement with anything more than the affidavit of Conaway. See
Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
35
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• JPMorgan Chase and JPM Securities were entitled to change the structure,
terms pricing, or amount of the DIP Credit Facility; and
• Until each initial lender under the DIP Credit Facility was reduced by
assignment to no more than $250 million (or greater if satisfactory to the
lender), the aggregate usage of the DIP Credit Facility will be limited to $1. 75
billion. 96
Kmart’s motion was granted on January 25, 2002.

In the order, the court

incorporated the credit agreement as requested by Kmart. 97

Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
97 Order Approving DIP Credit Agreement and Related Documents (Entered on the Docket Jan. 25, 2002).

96
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Chapter Seven
BEST FRIENDS: KMART’S CRITICAL VENDOR MOTION
The hot, harsh sun beats down on the hundreds, perhaps thousands, waiting in the line snaked around a
solitary well. Those who are fortunate will receive a cupful or two of relief; others will get nothing.
Suddenly, a small group of figures push their way to the front.
“We’ll each take a gallon,” their leader says.
“But that’s not fair. There’s only so much to go around,” the well keeper replies.
“We don’t care, We’re critical vendors.” 98
In this chapter, the motion to pay critical vendors will be examined in detail.
Although Kmart’s motion to pay critical vendors was originally granted by the court, the
bankruptcy court’s order was reversed on appeal by the district court. To the surprise of
many, the district court’s reversal was upheld on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. The details of
the critical vendor motion are necessary to understand the importance of this reversal.
A.

The Bankruptcy Court Decision

As one of its twenty-five first day motions, Kmart Corporation requested
authorization for payment of pre-petition claims of certain “critical” trade vendors. 99 In the
motion, Kmart requested the authorization to pay vendors that were “essential to the
uninterrupted functioning of the Debtor’s business operations.” 100 The vendors listed in the
motion were the grocery vendor Fleming Companies, the music vendor Handleman

Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev.
411, 413 (2003).

98

Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical
Trade Vendors, 1 (Filed Jan 22, 2002).
99

100

Id. at 7-8.
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Company, egg and dairy vendors, and other vendors who supplied goods and services
related to advertising. 101 All told, Kmart owed these vendors a total of $183.8 million. 102
Table 1: “Critical” Vendors 103
Vendor

Fleming

Handleman

Egg and Dairy Vendors

Advertising

Relationship to Kmart
Fleming was a food
distribution company that
supplied substantially all of
the food and consumable
products in the Debtor’s
stores. Food sales accounted
for $4.2 billion, or 11%, of
Kmart’s yearly sales.
Handleman was Kmart’s sole
music vendor. Music sales in
Kmart accounted for $500
million, or 1.5%, of Kmart’s
yearly sales.
Kmart’s eggs and dairy were
supplied by a network of
small vendors. Egg and dairy
sales accounted for
approximately $160 million,
or 0.5%, of Kmart’s yearly
sales.
Kmart depended upon many
newspapers, ad production
businesses, and commodity
paper suppliers to supply
weekly newspaper
advertisements. Kmart
estimated that advertising
generated $11 billion, or 30%
of their yearly sales.

Total Owed

$76 Million

$64 Million

$6.8 Million

$37 Million

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-11.
103 Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical
Trade Vendors, 1 (Filed Jan 22, 2002).

101
102
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What made the critical vendor motion extraordinary was the sweeping nature of its
request for relief. Kmart requested authority “to pay all, a portion [of,] or none of the
Critical Vendor Claims as determined by Debtors in their sole discretion.” 104 Kmart announced
the intention to force the critical vendors to sign a trade agreement in exchange for the
money, which would place limits on future claims and litigation. But Kmart requested the
authority to make the payments even if no trade agreement could be reached if, “in their
business judgment, that failure to pay the Critical Vendor Claim is likely to result in
irreparable harm to the Debtors’ business operations.” 105 Further, if the critical vendor
declined to comply with the trade agreement, Kmart sought:
authority, in their discretion and without further order of the court, (a) to
declare that any Trade Agreement between the Debtors and
such Critical Vendor is terminated (if applicable), and (b) to
declare that provisional payments made to Critical Vendors on
account of Critical Vendor Claims be deemed to have been in
payment of then-outstanding post-petition claims of such
vendors without further order of the Court or action by any
person or entity. 106
Further, if Kmart chose to terminate the trade agreement, they sought the authority to force
the return of any payments made to the critical vendors. 107
The authority cited by Kmart for their requests was Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 108 Kmart noted that
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
106 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
107 Id.
104
105
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several courts had used this provision to justify the “‘necessity of payment’ doctrine to
authorize payment of a debtor’s pre-petition obligations where, as here, such payment is
necessary to effectuate the ‘paramount purpose’ of chapter 11 reorganization, which is to
prevent the debtor from going in to liquidation and to preserve the debtor’s potential for
rehabilitation.” 109
However, Kmart’s motion to pay critical vendors was opposed by Capital Factors
(“Capital”). Capital was a factoring agent, purchasing accounts receivable and assuming the
collection responsibilities, for some of Kmart’s apparel suppliers. Capital held unsecured
claims of about $20 million. Capital was not listed as a “critical vendor” by Kmart, and so
the payment of the “critical vendors” shrunk the amount of cash that would be available to
satisfy Capital’s claims when it came time to do so under a confirmed plan of reorganization
or otherwise. 110
Four days after the first day motion to allow payment to critical trade vendors, the
bankruptcy judge signed an order granting the requested relief. Kmart was “authorized, but
not directed, in the reasonable exercise of their business judgment, to pay all, a portion or
none of the pre-petition claims” of the critical vendors. 111 Further, Kmart was given
authorization to enter into trade agreements with the critical vendors in exchange for
payment. 112 However, if Kmart used “diligent efforts” to get the critical vendors to sign the

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
110 Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corporation, 291 Bankr.Rep. 818, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
111 Order Under U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical Trade Vendors,2

108

109

(Jan 26, 2002).
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trade agreements, they could pay the vendors without an agreement if the “failure to pay the
Critical Vendor Claim is likely to result in irreparable harm to the Debtors’ business
operations.” 113 In sum, every major request Kmart presented in the motion was granted.
B.

Critical Reservations?

Although the court did eventually overrule the objections of Capital, it expressed
some reservations regarding Kmart’s motion:
Motions to pay critical trade creditors always present difficult questions for
courts. We’re seeing more and more of them, and our problem is that we
have to stretch to find some authority to do them. However, I, after hearing
this testimony and reading the affidavit [of Charles C. Conaway, Kmart’s
Chief Executive Officer], am convinced that Fleming, Handleman and the egg
and dairy vendors…as well as the advertising concerns, are necessary to keep
this business going as a going concern. 114
The reservations expressed by the court are significant for two related reasons. First, the
court’s order allowing the payment of critical vendors was eventually reversed. In particular,
the order was reversed specifically because there was no legal support for the grant of the
motion. Even the bankruptcy court recognized that the legal support for the motion was
thin, and that it needed “to stretch” to find in favor of Kmart. Second, the statement by the
court exemplifies the attitude, so common among bankruptcy judges, to approve first day
motions without deeply questioning their legal support, even when they know it is thin. 115
Perhaps the judge was afraid to question a debtor such as Kmart out of fear that other large
companies would choose other forums if the courts of the Northern District of Illinois were
Id. at 4.
Id.
114 Id. (citing App. to Appellee’s Brief).
115 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (963) (2010).
112
113
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viewed as hostile to critical vendor motions and other aggressive reorganization techniques
that are accepted in jurisdictions that might be described as “accommodating.” In any case,
the Kmart judge appeared content to go along with the common practice of the time.

So

long as there was a sufficient showing that the vendors listed by Kmart were “critical,” the
court apparently felt that it was unnecessary to look beyond section 105(a) for legal support.
When the bankruptcy court granted Kmart’s “critical vendor” orders, one
commentator viewed it as just one decision among many confirming the practice. In June
2002, Bruce Nathan examined various decisions regarding critical vendors in “Critical
Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors.”
Nathan recognized that courts often allowed general unsecured claims to be given higher
priority if the creditors were deemed to be “critical.” As part of his analysis, he noted that
Kmart obtained orders authorizing extensive payments to several “critical” vendors. These
payments were cited as part of a larger trend in which “low-priority, pre-petition general
unsecured claims can be converted to higher-priority administrative claims arising from postpetition credit sales to the debtor.” 116
Later developments, such as the motion’s eventual reversal by the District Court, are
examined in Chapter Nine.

See Bruce S. Nathan, Critical Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors, 21
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 14, 14 (2002). However, the author did note that In re CoServeL.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2002), held that a critical vendor payment (1) must be indispensable to the debtor’s business, (2) non-payment
of the claim risks probable harm, and (3) there is no practical or legal alternative to payment of the claim. Id. at 33.
116
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Chapter Eight
IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST
There is only one class in the community that thinks more about money than the rich, and that is the poor.
The poor can think of nothing else.

Oscar Wilde
After the flurry of first day motions, the parties in Kmart’s chapter 11 case created a
veritable blizzard of filings. One month into the bankruptcy, 937 items had been entered on
to the docket (approximately 40 per day). By six months, the docket grew to over 5000
items, and after one year the docket totaled over 8000 documents. 117
An examination of all of these documents is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, two topics are of particular importance. First, this chapter examines Kmart’s
treatment of unexpired pre-petition leases. Kmart used the bankruptcy code to shed
unprofitable store operations. Trimming excess costs was crucial to Kmart’s survival and
eventual reorganization. Second, this chapter examines Kmart’s treatment of JDA Software.
Companies are often granted administrative priority for post-petition claims under the
theory that this will encourage them to cooperate with the debtor. As JDA Software
discovered, however, the grant of administrative priority is not automatic.

Even if a

company provides post-petition services, a debtor may avoid granting priority to its unless
the company can prove that its services benefited the estate.
A.

Unexpired Leases

Before filing for bankruptcy, Kmart was a party to about 2,000 real property leases,
mostly for retail outlets. The day after filing for bankruptcy, Kmart filed a motion for
117

Docket Report.
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permission to reject approximately 365, or approximately 18%, of its unexpired pre-petition
real estate leases. 118 Even after the rejection of so many leases, the claims of landlords under
the remaining, assumed leases comprised the largest claim against the estate.

119

As a support for its motion, Kmart made several claims. First, Kmart claimed that
“Debtors have determined that rejecting the Real Property Leases as of the Rejection Date
for each Real Property Lease is in the best interests of the Debtors’ estates, creditors and
other parties in interest. 120 Second, Kmart claimed that they, in conjunction with their real
estate advisors, had evaluated the possibility of assigning the leases and determined that they
do not have “any marketable value beneficial to the Debtors’ estates.” Third, Kmart noted
that the retention of the leases would involve the payment of real estate taxes, utilities,
insurance and other related charges. The payment of these expenses would not bring any
benefit to the estate. Fourth, Kmart noted that the costs associated with the leases were
substantial and “constitute an unnecessary drain” on its resources.

Fifth, the savings

resulting from rejecting the leases would favorably affect Kmart’s cash flow. Finally, “no
person has expressed any interest in purchasing or taking an assignment of the Real Property
Leases.” 121

Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired
Real Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002).
119 See chart on page 65.
120 Kmart does not appear to support this claim with any hard facts or financial analysis. As well, they note that they
are not finished with their review and evaluation of the unexpired leases.
121 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired
Real Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002
118
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As with other motions filed during the first days of bankruptcy, the factual support
proposed for the motion was in the form of an affidavit of Conaway. 122 The wording of the
motion largely tracked the language of Conaway’s affidavit, or visa-versa. 123
Through the motion, Kmart sought two types of relief. First, Kmart sought the
ability to reject outright certain leases, which they listed on Schedule A. Second, Kmart
sought permission to reject some or all of the leases on Schedule B, and they specifically
sought permission to retain some of the leases on Schedule B without seeking further
permission from the bankruptcy court.

124

Sections 105 and 365(a) were proposed by Kmart as the legal support for the motion.
Kmart noted that: (1) generally the assumption or rejection of leases was subject to review
under the business judgment standard, (2) this standard is satisfied if the debtor determines
the action will benefit the estate, and (3) that courts show great deference to a debtor’s
decision to reject. Further, Kmart noted that the lessors would have ample opportunity to
object to this motion, so they would not be prejudiced. 125
A few days later, the court granted all of Kmart’s requests. 126 Although several
leasees objected to Kmart’s motion, their objections were overruled. 127 A Notice of
Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002
122

123 Affidavit and statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, 93 (filed
Jan. 25, 2002).

Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002

124

Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002
125

Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real Property Leases
and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 25, 2002).
126
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Rejection to be sent to the affected lessors, a copy of which was filed with Kmart’s original
motion, was filed on February 19, 2002. 128
B.

JDA Software, Post-petition Services, and Administrative Priority

This section will be divided into two parts. First, Kmart’s use of section 503(b)
throughout its bankruptcy work is briefly summarized to show how the court granted
administrative priority to companies performing post-petition work. Second, JDA’s failed
request for administrative priority is examined in detail.
i.

Kmart’s General Use of Section 503(b)

Section 503(b) of the bankruptcy code deals with the “allowance of administrative
expenses.” In particular, section 503(b) provides that “the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate” are to be treated as an administrative expense. The
statute specifically lists “wages, salaries, and commissions,” but it does not specify any other
form of expenses. 129 However, cases have held that any post-petition expenses incurred by
the estate will qualify if they are necessary and benefit the estate. This is true even if the
expenses do not benefit creditors. 130 The court is not permitted approve a plan of
reorganization that does not provide for the payment of administrative expenses, unless the
holder of the claim agrees otherwise. 131
See, for example, Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases, Bank of New York (filed Feb.
15, 2002) and Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases, Menard Inc. (filed Feb. 15,
2002).
128 Notice of Rejection (filed Feb. 19, 2002).
129 See 11 U.S.C. 503(b).
130 See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968);In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18 (2d.Cir. 1996).
131 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
127
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Throughout the course of the bankruptcy, Kmart was granted permission to treat the
claims of many post-petition vendors as administrative claims. For instance, these claims
covered such items as purchase orders issued pre-petition but satisfied post-petition by the
delivery of goods and services; 132post-petition obligations relating to license bonds issued by
Hartford;

133

and expenses incurred by Kmart stores that were closed down during

bankruptcy. 134
i.

JDA Software’s Post-petition Claims

As JDA Software (“JDA”) discovered, however, Section 503(b) does not provide a
blanket protection to vendors who perform post-petition services to the debtor. Rather, the
services performed must result in a real benefit to the debtor. For the purposes of Section
503(b), potential or future benefits are not sufficient to provide administrative priority.
a.

JDA’s Pre-Petition Work for Kmart

Kmart began a business relationship with JDA on June 22, 2001, exactly seven
months before Kmart declared bankruptcy. Under the contracts signed by Kmart, JDA
agreed to make modifications to software for Kmart’s “Caribbean Project” (“Services
Agreement”).

135As

well, JDA agreed to provide “telephone and e-mail support, updates, and

program temporary fixes” starting March 1, 2002 (“Support Agreement”). On the day that

ORDER in accordance with section 503[b][1][A] of Bankruptcy Code, the Debtors are authorized to treat purchase
orders issued pre-petition but satisfied post-petition by the delivery of goods, merchandise or other services as postpetition administrative expenses (filed 2/13/2002).
133 STIPULATION AND ORDER to lift stay to terminate certain surety bond's of Hartford (filed 3/6/2002).
134 Among many others, see Agreed Order Resolving Lease Rejection and Administrative Claims for Kmart Store No
9453 (Signed on Oct. 26, 2004).
135 In this project, Kmart planned on opening a store in Trinidad “and subsequent stores of an unspecified number in
the Caribbean region.”
132
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Kmart filed bankruptcy, JDA was owed in excess of $1. 2 million for services rendered to
Kmart. However, JDA had not completed all the services originally requested by Kmart. 136
b.

JDA’s Post-Petition Work for Kmart

Soon after Kmart filed for bankruptcy, representatives of the company reassured
JDA that it would be paid in full for all post-petition work. Eric Haskel, the international
CFO of Kmart, and Steven Hunter, the Divisional Vice President of Kmart’s Information
Systems Application Department, “represented that Kmart would ensure that JDA ‘be made
whole’ for all services rendered by JDA prior to the Filing Date. ” As well, Haskel promised
that Kmart would pay for all post-Bankruptcy Filing services rendered by JDA within thirty
30 days of invoice “even if I have to write the check myself.” 137
Armed with a promise from the international CFO, 138 JDA continued to provide
work with Kmart under the terms of the Services Agreement under on a “time and materials
basis.” It appears that all work completed performed by JDA was satisfactory, and one
Kmart employee noted that JDA’s “team was the first to not only bring a solid
understanding of the system process, but an even better understanding of the business
environment.” 139 Eventually, JDA provided a total of $291,597.07 of post-petition services
to Kmart. 140

Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb.
10, 2003).
137 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002).
138 The significance of Haskel’s statement is downplayed in the Stipulation of Agreed Facts: “JDA representatives were
told by at least one Kmart representative that work performed post-petition would be compensated as an administrative
expense under Section 503.” See Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by
JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 10, 2003).
139 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002).
136
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At the beginning of February, JDA requested payment for the work it had completed
since the petition date. 141 A few days later, Kmart informed JDA that “the opening of a
Caribbean store was being delayed, and, as a result, JDA’s services were no longer
needed.” 142 JDA moved for all of its post-petition work to be recognized as administrative
expenses. 143
c.

Law Regarding Administrative Expenses in the Seventh
Circuit

In the Seventh Circuit, courts have provided priority treatment for administrative
expenses under section 503 “to encourage creditors to deal with the debtor in possession
and thereby support the reorganization effort.” Section 503(b) states in part that “[a]fter
notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses…including, - the actual,
necessary costs of preserving the estate.” In granting administrative priority to claims under
section 503, the Seventh Circuit uses the two-pronged Jartran test. First, the claims must arise
“out of a transaction with the debtor in possession.” Second, the transaction must be
“beneficial to the operation of the debtor in possession’s business.” 144
d.

JDA’s Argues That It Provided a Benefit to Kmart

JDA argued that the post-petition services that it provided to Kmart were beneficial.
First, they noted the fact that the international CFO specifically promised that the services
Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb.
10, 2003).
141 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002).
142 Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb.
10, 2003).
143 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002).
144 In re Kmart, 293 B.R. 905, 909 (2003).

140
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would be treated as administrative expenses. In reliance upon this promise, “JDA personnel
attended numerous meetings, provided status reports and other consulting functions all in
furtherance of the Caribbean Project and benefiting the Debtor’s business as a whole.” 145
In particular, JDA focused on the fact that Kmart requested the post-petition services. JDA
warned that if their claims were not granted administrative status, the result “would allow the
debtor to require performance under its executor contracts while it considers its options, as
Kmart did, and then decide after the fact whether it wants to pay for those services. Such a
result is wholly inequitable and inconsistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy
Code. . . . ” Further, the entire purpose of 503 would be frustrated, as vendors would refuse
to do business under circumstances that might result in unpaid or underpaid claims. 146
e.

Kmart Argues That It Was Not Provided With a Benefit

Kmart admitted that JDA’s claims arose out of a transaction with Kmart, but argued
that Kmart was not provided with any benefit from JDA’s work. Specifically, Kmart noted
that the use of the words “necessary and “actual” in section 503(b) were held by the Seventh
Circuit to exclude merely potential benefits and to ensure that the estate is actually
benefitted. Although the software developed by JDA might have been partially delivered to
Kmart, Kmart never used any of the software developed by JDA and deleted all copies of
the software from its computers. As well, Kmart noted that JDA could not prove that
Kmart had ever used the software.

145

Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002).

146

Response of JDA Software, Inc. To Debtors’ Motion for Summary Judgment With Incorporated Memorandum

of Law Against the Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 24 2003).
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f.

The Bankruptcy Court Rules in Favor of Kmart

The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Kmart. The court found that JDA collapsed
the two-pronged test Jartran test and essentially ignored the “benefit” prong. Although JDA
admittedly was induced by Kmart to continue work post-petition, this merely confirms that
JDA entered into a transaction with Kmart. “Whether the estate benefitted from such a
transaction, however, is a separate inquiry altogether, and one engaged in only after
concluding that the creditor entered into a transaction with the debtor in possession. Put
another way, post-petition performance alone does not automatically translate into a benefit
to the estate, even if there was inducement on the part of the debtor.” The mere presence
of a potential benefit is too speculative to count as an “actual” or “necessary” cost of the
estate under 503(b).
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Chapter Nine
SOMETIMES A PARENT HAS TO SAY NO
Next to doing the right thing, the most important thing is to let people know you are doing the right thing.
John D. Rockefeller
On April 10, 2003, about one month before Kmart was scheduled to exit bankruptcy,
District Judge Grady heard oral argument an appeal on Kmart’s critical vendor motion.
The appellant was Capital Factors - a vendor who had unsuccessfully requested status as a
“critical vendor.”

Judge Grady reversed the order authorizing payment of the critical

vendors and concluded that neither § 105(a) nor a “doctrine of necessity” supported the
orders.” 147 This chapter will examine the district court’s decision and briefly review the
critical commentary written soon after the decision.
A.

Bankruptcy Court Decision

The central issue raised by Capital Factors was “whether there was a sufficient
evidentiary basis for the bankruptcy court to allow payment of [the critical vendor]
claims.” 148 As noted above, § 105 allows a court to “issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the bankruptcy code. 149
Although Kmart did not specifically refer to the “doctrine of necessity,” the court found that
its claim that the payments were “necessary,” “integral” and had a “good business
justification” made it apparent that Kmart had relied upon the doctrine. Further, if the
Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart. Corp., 291 Bankr. Rep. 818, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Id. at 821.
149 11. U.S.C. § 105(a).
147

148
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“doctrine of necessity” was not codified in the bankruptcy rules, it must be applied via §
105. 150
Significantly, precedent from the Seventh Circuit stated that § 105 only allowed a
court to “enforce the provisions of the Code, not to add on to the Code” as sees fit.
Further, the Code does not provide priority “based on the ‘critical’ or ‘integral’ status of a
creditor.” Therefore, the bankruptcy court in Kmart “altered the priority scheme set forth in
the Bankruptcy Code.” 151 Although the district court acknowledged that there was a split
among the courts regarding the proper application of § 105, the district court could not:
ignore the Bankruptcy code’s statutory scheme of priority in favor of “equity,”
especially in light of the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that “[t]he fact that a
[bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of
justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be. ” 152
As well, although the “doctrine of necessity was “well-intended” and even
“beneficial,” its application in this case simply was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.
“Congress has not elected to codify the doctrine of necessity or otherwise permit pre-plan
payment of pre-petition unsecured claims.” Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not have
either the statutory or the equitable power to “authorize the pre-plan payment of prepetition unsecured claims.” 153

As a consequence, the “critical vendor” orders were

reversed. 154
150Id.

at 822.

151Id.
152Id.
153Id.

at 823.

154Id.

at 825.
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B.

Critical Commentary

The reversal of the bankruptcy court was immediately recognized as an important
and potentially influential decision. In 2003, two members of Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher
& Flom 155 published a paper entitled “First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11
Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip Financing and Cash Management Issues).” 156 The paper noted
that motions to pay pre-petition claims of critical vendors were commonly justified when
vendors might refuse to cooperate with the company’s reorganizational efforts and when the
vendor is particularly essential to the operations of the business. However, the authors
recognized that the traditional views of critical vendors were rejected by the district court in
Kmart. The paper predicted several possible effects of the Kmart decision. First, the authors
posited that the decision may work to the benefit of debtors as they will no longer be
inundated with requests from vendors to be placed on the “critical vendor list.” Second, the
decision may call into doubt many traditional first day motions justified by the doctrine of
necessity such as the payment of pre-petition wages and salaries. 157
Andrew Currie and Sean McCann also noted the potentially wide ranging effect of
the Kmart reversal.

Before Kmart, courts “typically” allowed payments to critical vendors.

However, they stated that the reversal of critical vendor payments raised “serious concerns
about the continued viability of the doctrine of necessity.” They predicted several changes if
the decision was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. First, venue choices would be influenced as

SkaddenArps represented Kmart in the bankruptcy.
See Jay M. Goffman& Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip
Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J. Bankr. L &Prac.59, 69-70, 73-75 ((2003).
157 See Jay M. Goffman& Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip
Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J. Bankr. L &Prac.59, 69-70, 73-75 ((2003).
155

156
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payments to critical vendors would no longer be available in the Seventh Circuit. Second,
other circuits might elect to follow the Seventh Circuit’s example, which would erode the
confidence with which debtors typically approach first day motions. Third, vendors that
would typically have been critical would now be treated like every other creditor. Fourth,
the decision would likely slow down the trend of permitting the estate to make substantial
payments in the first few days of the case, before most creditors were up to speed, and prior
to the formation of the creditors’ committee. 158
Thomas J. Salerno 159 noted that critical vendor motions had become “standard
procedure,” so much so that “most firms that do a substantial amount of debtor work have
emergency motions (along with accompanying affidavits) on their word processors, ready to
go.” Salerno offered several criticisms of Kmart’s handling of the appeal. First, in the
context of Kmart, Critical Factor’s claim of $20 million was small. Kmart should have
settled with Critical Factor before an appeal became necessary. In essence, Salerno was
asserting that Kmart and Skadden, Arps should have engineered matters so that the critical
vendor motion evaded review by an Article III District Court that might take a less
expansive view of a bankruptcy court’s section 105 powers than had the Kmart bankruptcy
court. Second, several legal grounds could have been asserted by Kmart to support the
critical vendor motion, but they were not.

Most notably, Salerno speculated that the

bankruptcy court may have been able to base its grant of critical vendor status upon the
158 See Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart, 22 Am.
Bankr.
Inst. J. 1 (Jun. 2003).
159 It should be noted that Salerno is presenting the case strictly from the perspective of debtor’s counsel. For instance,
the paper begins “Who would have thunk it? Just when practitioners get bankruptcy judges properly trained, some
appellate court steps in and messes it all up.” Thomas J. Salerno, “The Mouse that Roared” Or “Hell Hath no Fury Like a
Critical Vendor Scorned,” 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 28, 28 (Jun. 2003).
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requirement that the vendors agreed to extend post-petition, debtor-in-possession financing
pursuant to Code § 364(b). Finally, Salerno noted that one of the effects of the decision
might include Chicago’s loss of “its recently acquired, coveted place as the haven for big
cases.” 160

Thomas J. Salerno, “The Mouse that Roared” Or “Hell Hath no Fury Like a Critical Vendor Scorned,” 22 Am. Bankr. Inst.
J. 28 (Jun. 2003).
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Chapter Ten
ALONG COMES A SPIDER
The way to become rich is to put all your eggs in one basket and then watch that basket.
Andrew Carnegie
In the months after Kmart filed for bankruptcy, the stock of the company
plummeted. Some commentators even expressed doubt as to whether Kmart would be able
to emerge from bankruptcy at all. 161 In the best case scenario, Kmart’s creditors would be
forced to wait a long time before they got any money, and the amount that they would
receive was uncertain. In this time of uncertainty, ESL saw an extraordinary financial
opportunity.
A.

Evaluating the financials

As noted in Chapter 4, ESL is a “vulture” hedge fund that specialized in buying up
distressed companies. 162 By 2002, ESL’s CEO, Edward Lampert, already owned some of
Kmart’s debt, and in the months following Kmart’s bankruptcy he began to examine the
possibility of buying even larger amounts of Kmart’s defaulted bonds. 163 The risks were
great as the financials of Kmart were in shambles. 164

Sherri Day, Kmart Faces Hurdle on Plan To Exit Bankruptcy Soon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2003.
A vulture fund is a private equity or hedge fund that invests in debt issued by an entity that is considered to be
very weak or dying, or whose debt is in imminent default.
163 Amounts are uncertain because the debt market is private.
164 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at App. D , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
161

162
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Consolidated Balance Sheets in millions of $

2001

2000

TOTAL ASSETS:

1, 245

401

Cash and cash equivalents

5, 796

6, 350

800

925

Total current assets

7, 841

7, 676

Property and equipment, net

6, 093

6, 522

249

617

14, 183

14, 815

Merchandise inventories

Other assets and deferred charges

Total assets

58

TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY:
Long-term debt due within one year

0

68

89

2, 190

Accrued payroll and other liabilities

420

1, 691

Taxes other than income taxes

143

187

Total current liabilities

652

4, 136

Long-term debt and notes payable

330

2, 084

Capital lease obligations

857

943

Other long-term liabilities

132

883

Total liabilities not subject to compromise

1, 971

8, 046

Liabilities subject to compromise

8, 093

0

Company obligated mandatorily redeemable convertible

889

887

Common stock- share outstanding: 494 million-2001: 506

503

487

Capital in excess of par value

1, 695

1, 578

Retained earnings

1, 032

3, 817

14, 183

14, 815

Accounts payable

Total liabilities and equity
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Data as of January 20, 2002 and January 31, 2001. As of fiscal year 2001, Kmart had a net
operating loss (NOL) carry forward of $369 million and total deferred assets of $1,369
million. By Fiscal year end 2002, these amounts had increased to $1,143 million and $2,466
million, respectively. In both years, Kmart recovered a full valuation allowance against these
assets to reflect the uncertainty of its future earnings.

An intriguing question is what did ESL see that no other investor saw in Kmart’s financials?
Even with a new management team, there was no guarantee that Kmart could find a way to
competein a market dominated by Wal-Mart and Target.

If anything, Kmart was losing ground on its two largest competitors. However,
Lampert identified Kmart’s one indisputable asset: below-market leases. ESL believed that
even if Kmart itself could not be salvaged, the company would still be valuable in liquidation
because of its real estate holdings. 165 Although Kmart owned some of its big-box retail
locations, most of the stores were on long-term leases. At the time of bankruptcy, these
David Stowell, An Introduction to Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity: The New Paradigm 478
(Kellogg School of Management ed., Academic Press 2010).
165
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leases were considerably below market rate, and they would be valuable even in the event
that Kmart had to sell leases to other business. 166 Officially, ESL stated that it intended to
maintain Kmart as a retailer and that the company would be profitable by 2007.
B.

Taking the plunge

Once Lampert determined that Kmart was worth the investment, his company
moved swiftly to become Kmart’s majority creditor. During the spring of 2002, ESL began
quietly accumulating Kmart’s defaulted bonds. 167 By the summer of 2002, ESL had
accumulated more than $1 billion of the company’s defaulted debt. 168 By September 2002,
ESL had a voice in the restructuring project through a seat on the financial institutions
committee.
It did not take long for Lampert to begin asserting his newfound influence over
Kmart’s bankruptcy. In particular, Lampert wanted to speed up the bankruptcy process. 169
In early November of 2002, Lampert met with Kmart’s Chairman and CEO, Jim Adamson,
to emphasize the importance of Kmart’s early emergence from bankruptcy.

Lampert

pressed Mr. Adamson to file a plan of reorganization by Thanksgiving. 170 When the
When Wall Street analysts implied that Lampert only wanted to take control of Kmart merely in order to sell the
leases, he responded that “no retailer should aspire to have its real estate be worth more than its operating business.” Of
course, Lampert never claimed to be a retailer.

166

167

Trading in distressed debt often occurs through private, unpublished transactions, so the exact timing and size of

Lampert’s trades are unknown.
168

Although it is hard to pinpoint dates, the amount is consistent with a timeline created by UBS investment bank.

On July 24, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court extended the Debtors’ exclusive period through February 28, 2003 and the
solicitation period to April 22, 2003. Because the Debtors’ required more time still, the court entered an order on
February 25, 2003 that extended the filing period and solicitation period to June 30, 2003 and August 31, 2003,
respectively.
169

170

ESL lacked experience both in bankruptcy proceedings and in the running of businesses with the majority-control of

a company’s stock.
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company did not meet this deadline, Lampert’s attorney successfully demanded Adamson’s
resignation. 171 Julian Day was appointed the new CEO of Kmart in January 2003, and the
process of reorganization began moving at a rapid pace.
C.

Proposing a plan

Throughout early 2003, ESL continued to buy Kmart debt in private negotiated
transactions. 172 Kmart’s creditors, both banks and bond investors, made it clear to ESL that
they would prefer to end their involvement with Kmart rather than taking stock in the New
Holding Company. 173

David Stowell, An Introduction to Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity: The New Paradigm
478 (Kellogg School of Management ed., Academic Press 2010).
172 The amount acquired during this time is unknown.
173 They probably believed Kmart could not be a viable company for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 5.
171
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Chapter Eleven
CRACKING THE BANK
The ladder of success is best climbed by stepping on the rungs of opportunity.
Ayn Rand

Because of the complexity of the plan, only selected individual issues will be
addressed in the proceeding five chapters. The discussion will begin with the financial
condition of Kmart followed by the class structure under the plan. An analysis of Kmart’s
business reasons will be addressed followed by a liquidity analysis. Finally, what occurred on
the Effective Date will be analyzed. 174
The previous chapter analyzed the reasons why ESL believed that Kmart was worth
the risk of investing in based on its current and historic financial statements. This chapter
analyzes the value of Kmart to determine how much that investment should be. 175 The

The following chapters are based on the Disclosure Statement. The Disclosure Statement contains Kmart’s history,
business properties and operations, projections for those operations, risk factors associated with the business, a plan, a
summary and analysis of the plan, and the financial statements related to the plan. Under section 1125(b) of the
bankruptcy code, a vote to accept or reject the plan cannot be solicited from a claimholder or interest holder unless a
Disclosure Statement has been approved by the bankruptcy court as containing the necessary adequate
information.Adequate information is defined in 11 U.S.C. 1125(a) as: (1)information of a kind, and in sufficient detail,
as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books
and records, including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any
successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in the case, that would
enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but adequate
information need not include such information about any other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a
disclosure statement provides adequate information, the court shall consider the complexity of the case, the benefit of
additional information to creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional information; and (2)
“investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class” means investor having— (A) a claim or interest of
the relevant class; (B) such a relationship with the debtor as the holders of other claims or interests of such class
generally have; and (C) such ability to obtain such information from sources other than the disclosure required by this
section as holders of claims or interests in such class generally have.
174

175

Based on economic and market conditions as they existed and could be evaluated as of January 13, 2003.
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Financial Advisors for the purposes of the Plan, estimated that the value of the reorganized
Kmartin a hypothetical Chapter 11 reorganization, was between $2,250 million to $3,000
million. The equity valueof reorganized Kmart was estimated to range from $753 million to
$1,503 million. 176
Valuation Data ($ in millions except per-share data)
Low
Aggregate firm value

Median

High

$2, 250

$2, 625

$3, 000

Aggregate equity value

$753

$1, 128

$1, 503

Shares outstanding

86.24

86.24

86.24

Equity value per share

$8.74

$13.08

$17.43

In arriving at the reorganized Kmart value, the Financial Advisors performed three
types of analysis.
First, Kmart was analyzed according to a comparable public company analysis.Under
this analysis, a subject company is valued by comparing it to publically held companies in

In arriving at these estimates, the Financial Advisors relied on a series of projections regarding the future
performance of Kmart, performance of the industry, and general business and economic conditions beyond the control
of Kmart including: (1) Net Sales for 2003 as compared to 2002 were projected to decrease by 17.5% due to the closure
of 283 stores. Net sales were expected to increase .7% in 2004, 5.3% in 2005, 5.5% in 2006 and 5.9% in 2007, (2) gross
margins from 18% in 21.5% in 2007 because of improved promotional productivity, favorable product mix and marked
improvement due to increased import purchases, (3) administrative expenses to remain at 20% from 2002 and 2003 as
lower depreciation expense generated by fresh start accounting adjustments is offset by the effects of store closings and
the resulting lower sales base (4) income taxes will be substantially offset by its unused net loss carry forwards against
Kmart’s cancellation of debt income on the effective date.
176
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reasonably similar lines of business. 177The analytical work performed includes a comparing
the enterprise value (market value of equity plus debt and minus excess cash) of Kmart to
similar companies.
Second, Kmart was analyzed through the discounted cash flow method. The
discounted cash flow method related the value of Kmart to the present value of any
expected future cash flows to be generated by Kmart. The discounted cash flow method is a
forward-looking approach that discounts the expected future cash flows by a theoretical or
observed discount rate. For purposes of the valuation analysis, a discount rate between 20%
and 25% was used. 178
Third, Kmart was analyzed through a comparable acquisition analysis.The
comparable acquisition analysis entails calculating multiples of revenues, earnings and book
value based on prices paid (including debt assumed and equity purchased) in announced
mergers and acquisitions involving companies similar to Kmart. These multiples were then
applied, to the projected financials of Kmart to determine an implied range of enterprise and
equity values.The financial advisors (1) reviewed certain historical financial information of
Kmart for recent years and interim periods, (2) reviewed the projections and the
assumptions underlying them, (3) reviewed certain internal financial and operating data of
Kmart, (4) met with certain members of management to discuss Kmart’s operations and
future projects (including the operational changes contemplated by the business plan, (5)
The comparable public companies were chosen based on their similarity to the subject company’s business, presence
in the market and size. The price that an inventor is willing to pay in the public market for each company’s publicly
traded securities represents that company’s current and future prospects as well as the rate of return required on
investment.
178 This analysis reflected a number factors including: (1) business execution risk; (2) the nature and derivation of the
projections set forth in the Business Plan; and (3) the cost of equity for comparable companies.

177
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reviewed publicly available financial data and (6) considered certain economic and industry
information relevant to Kmart’s operating business and conducted such other analysis as the
Financial Advisors deemed appropriate. 179

The Financial Advisors did not make an independent valuation or appraisal of the assets or liabilities of Kmart, and
no such independent valuation or appraisal was provided to the Financial Advisors in connection with the valuation
analysis.
179
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Chapter Twelve
A TIME TO STAND: KMART PROPOSES A PLAN
Defeat is not the worst of failures. Not to have tried is the true failure.
George Edward Woodberry

The purpose of a Chapter 11 plan is to allow the debtor to exit Chapter 11.
Lingering in Chapter 11 erodes the confidence of vendors in Kmart, creates enormous stress
in employees personal lives, diminishes the financial condition of the company, and dims the
prospect for a successful reorganization. The terms of the plan are based primarily on the
company’s ability to realize the goals of its business plan, and extensive negotiations with
creditors. However, a central tenant of the Bankruptcy Code is equality of distribution
among similarly situated creditors which means classes have to be created fairly and creditors
are due their fair share.
Pursuant to section 1122 of the bankruptcy code, the plan contained five types of
unclassified claims, Administrative claims 180, Priority Tax claims 181, PBGC claims, Workers’
Compensation claims, and Consignment claims. In addition, the plan classified claims and
interests into twelve classes into which creditor claims will be funneled into to determine
how much money they would receive. 182 According to the plan, it was anticipated that all of

An administrative claim is a claim for payment of an administrative expense of a kind specified in §503(b)
of the bankruptcy code and entitled to priority pursuant to §507(a)(1) of the bankruptcy code.
181 Priority tax claims will be entitled to full satisfaction. The debtors estimate that priority tax lien will total $190
million.
180
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the unclassified claims would be paid in full; however the classified claims would be paid
only a percentage described in Appendix A. 183
Of the total claims asserted against the Debtors only about 14% will be paid. This below
graphic illustrates the amount distributed.

Amount distributed
Amount Undistributed

The dark blue part shows the actual amount of money of the total paid to creditors. The
amount paid out is not divided evenly among the classes. The graphic below illustrates how
payments are made among the classes that receive payment under the plan.

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 78 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
183 Appendix A
182

68

Class 1 : Secured claims

Class 3: Prepetition claims

Class 4: Prepetion note claims

Class 5: Trade Vendor/ Lease
rejection claims
Class 6: Other unsecured claims

Class 7: General unsecured
convenience claims

The distributions reflect extensive negotiations among the entities involved in the
case based on their respective positions.
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Chapter Thirteen
A NEW WAY FORWARD: THE BUSINESS PLAN
A good plan is like a road map: it shows the final destination and usually the best way to get there.
Stanley Judd

As part of its plan of reorganization, Kmart proposed an analysis of how it planned
to achieve success in the future.

First, Kmart proposed to change store policies to save

meet customer expectations and keep expenses down. Second, Kmart outlined its market
strategy for the next five years.
A.

Better Store Policies

The primary strategy of the Debtors for a successful reorganization is to “rationalize”
and “optimize” the company’s store and lease portfolio. 184 Kmart plans to reduce its stores
by 600 to 1,514. The stores that will be closed will be based on historical and projected
operating results, current and future competition, real estate value, store age, size, capital
spending requirements and other similar factors. 185
Only a month before Kmart planned to exit bankruptcy, their overall strategic
position remained unclear. ''They haven't articulated a strategy,'' said Walter K. Levy, the
managing director for retail trends and positioning at Kurt Salmon Associates. “All they've
done is have a series of tactics. They still haven't defined why the customer should shop
Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 61, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL)
185 Id.
184
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there rather than Wal-Mart or Target. That really is the bottom line.'' The company also was
criticized for hiring inexperienced chief merchandising and chief store operations officers.
''That's one of the reasons their same-store sales continue to trend downward,'' said Burt
Flickinger III, a managing partner of the Strategic Resource Group. ''Target and Wal-Mart
have at least stabilized during this recession.'' 186
Kmart’s response to these complaints in the media were less than persuasive. Kmart
declared it will continue with its promotional campaign and rely on the exclusive brands that
were unable to keep it afloat prior to the Petition Date. 187 Kmart claimed the difference it
will successful now because it has (1) improved inventory control, (2) better store
appearances, (3) a new “top seller” program, (4) “store of the future” campaign, and; (5) a
better marketing plan.
Before entering bankruptcy, Kmart worked for years to improve inventory control.
There was little reason to assume that Kmart would develop a successful supply chain
managementwhen there was still not a CIO 188 and the turnover at that position had been
constant for the past six years. Additionally, the development of a system is expensive and
Kmart simply could not afford to implement a program. 189 Finally, even if Kmart was able
to revamp its inventory control, it would still be starting far behind Target and Wal-Mart. 190
Sherri Day, Kmart Faces Hurdle on Plan To Exit Bankruptcy Soon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2003.
Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 62 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
188 Chief information officer
189 Steve Konicki,Now In Bankruptcy, Kmart Struggled With Supply Chain, Information Week, Jan. 28, 2002, at 13.
190 Id.
186
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As well, improving store appearance was a goal for Kmart even in the 1980’s. Kmart
planned to become a smaller “store of the neighborhood” with more local control; test a
“store of the future” with wider aisles; improve lighting, fixtures, and layout to help improve
the shopping experience; and expand their use of exclusive brands. Besides being expensive
to implement, none of these improvements significantly differentiated Kmart from WalMart or Target. 191
The top seller program 192 was been moderately successful in the test market of
Chicago - sales rose by 10%. 193 The program allows local managers greater flexibility and
control over purchasing and stocking, and the program helped alleviate some supply chain
concerns. The program was duplicated in Detroit, but the results were not sustainable. The
new program was expanded to all stores in July 2002. 194
The plans for the “store of the future” were to make the stores brighter, cleaner,
easier to navigate, and to put top selling merchandise closer to the entrance way.

It

remained unclear what role supercenters would have in the reorganized Kmart and how the
new initiatives would affect them. 195

Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited, Greenhouse Product News, Mar. 2003, at 3.
Focuses on improving sales and in-stock positions for each store’s 300 top selling items.
193 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 63 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
194 Id.
195 Debbie Howell, Supercenters key to Kmart's survival plan: New executive focused on execution,DSN Retailing Today, Oct. 7,
2002, at 1.
191
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Finally, the new marketing plan was to use a new customer relationship management
(CRM) planto target minorities. 196

The CRM plan was to listen to customers, and when they want to buy a product, actually
have the product in the store. In short, do what Wal-Mart has been doing for years. The
second part of the plan is to target minorities who made up 32% of Kmart’s shoppers. 197
While it is true that this segment is the fastest growing in the United States and has a buying
At the time, Kmart performed significantly better than Wal-Mart or Target in regards to minority sales.
Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 63 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
196
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power of $1.2 trillion dollars, the best sales that Kmartexperienced with this group was in
urban clusters where Wal-Mart and Target did not have a strong presence. 198 It was
unknown how much of the market share Kmart could capture of this demographic when
forced to compete with another national retailer.
In sum, Kmart’s strategy for survival was to become more like Wal-Mart. But this
was troubling because direct competition with Wal-Mart is what drove Kmart into
bankruptcy. 199 At the time of Kmart’s reorganization, Wal-Mart was already implementing
many of the strategies outlined by Kmart, and Wal-Mart had been doing this for
decades.

200Walter

Levy’s question of “why should shoppers shop at Kmart instead of Wal-

Mart or Target?” has largely been unaddressed.
B.

Market Factors for Success

Kmart articulated a five year plan that details how Kmart will return to profitability
by 2007. 2012003 would be a transition year and would see the implementation of the store
policies examined above. In 2004, Kmart planned to continue its recovery and have a $1.3
billion dollar surplus by 2007. The company planned to record $30.2 billion in sales in 2007,
up from $25.6 billion in 2003.

Id.
See Chapter 2.
200 See Chapter 2.
201 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 64 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
198

199
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There are numerous assumptions that are made under this analysis.

Further, the

factors are often difficult to predict because they are polycentric. The considerations involve
the return of customers after bankruptcy, the stabilization of vendor relations, the approval
of a plan, and the success of a number of new initiatives. Despite these complexities Kmart
still believed it would be profitable in the coming years as evidenced by its projected cash
flows:

75

Apart from these assumptions, there were tangible business reasons to believe Kmart
would be successful. As a result of chapter 11 protections, Kmart was able to shed much of
its burdensome real estate and lease portfolio. 202

This has reduced the average tent per

square foot from approximately $4.40 to $3.99. Additionally, 600 of the stores that were
closed were low-volume store
“optimization.” 204

203

allowing Kmart greater “rationalization” and

The proposed budget (taking into account the aforementioned cuts)

allows normalized maintenance to all remaining stores through fiscal 2007. The budget also
allows for opening 70 new stores, and approximately $175 million per year in other operating
improvement projects. 205
A second business reason for success was the shift away from pantry vendors and
instead to rely on self-distributing these products. Kmart rejected its supply contract with
Fleming, a grocery vendor that previously was deemed “critical.” The self-distributing was
expected to occur by middle of March 2003 and would increased utilization of Kmart’s
existing distribution centers by approximately 115 million cartons annually and reduced
excess capacity by 89%. Also, this method should increase sales by $450 million through

Kmart has eliminated more than 950 real estate leases, including 340 pertaining to dark stores; it has renegotiated
over 80 real property leases resulting in over $12 million in annual rent concessions; and has closed or identified 29% of
its lease stores for closing, representing 49% of its lease obligations on a gross basis.
202

203

Stores with annual sales less than $12 million.

Store closing are expected to increase average sales per store, projected average earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, amortization per store, and average return on invested capital.
204

205

Such as pharmacies, one-hour photo labs, and information technology upgrades.
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2006 and cement relationships with individual food and consumable vendors while allowing
Kmart control over vendor allowances processes. 206
Finally, Kmart assumed the contracts of its exclusive vendors, enabling the company
to offer unique merchandise and allowing it to pursue a targeted campaign along these
brands. 207

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at App. D, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).
206

Martha Stewart, Route 66, Kathy Ireland, Thalia, Joe Boxer, Curtis Matches, Jaclyn Smith, 123 Sesame Street,
Disney.
207
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Chapter Fourteen
NO TIME TO QUIT: LITIGATION ROADBLOCKS
If I owe you a pound, I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem is yours.
John Maynard Keynes
The committee of unsecured creditors threatened to prevent confirmation of the plan
by starting four types of litigation.
i.

Fraudulent Transfers

First, the committee of unsecured creditors threatened extended litigation over
various transfers made by Kmart over the two years preceding the bankruptcy. Section 548
of the bankruptcy code provides that the trustee may avoid certain transfers of property
made within two years of the petition date. 208 From 1998 to 2000, Kmart transferred assets
to various subsidiaries.

Specifically, Kmart transferred to each subsidiary the assets

constituting the business operations located in the respective states of each Kmart
subsidiary. These assets included real estate and inventory comprising the retail stores and
certain distribution centers. In exchange for the transfer of these assets, Kmart became the
owner of all the equity of the subsidiaries. Thus, as of the Petition Date, the subsidiaries
owned approximately 20% of the Debtor’s aggregate real estate and inventory.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548.Two types of transfers are avoidable. First, transfers of property are avoidable if they were
made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” any present or future creditor. Second, transfers of property
are avoidable if the debtor received “less than a reasonably equivalent value,” and was insolvent, had unreasonably
small capital, intended to incur un-repayable debts, or made the transfer to a business insider under an employment
contract.
208

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
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Further, in October 2000, Kmart of Michigan, Inc. (“KMI”) became the owner of
substantially all the trademarks, service marks, and trade names used in the Kmart business,
including the name “Kmart,” the big red K logo, “Super K” and similar marks. KMI
licensed the marks in exchange for royalty fees at a contract rate of approximately 1% of
such entities gross revenue. These fees averaged revenue of $75 million a quarter. 209 When
Kmart paid KMI’s royalty fee, KMI immediately loaned it back to Kmart. As of the petition
date, KMI had an intercompany claim against Kmart in the amount of $316 million. 210
ii.

The Committee Requests Substantive Consolidation

Second, the unsecured creditors committee also threatened to litigate whether the
various Kmart subsidiaries should be “substantively consolidated.” They argued that the
separate entities of Kmart should be disregarded pursuant to an “alter ego” and “piercing of
the corporate veil” theories. 211 This would result in a pooling of their assets for the benefit
of all creditors and not just the pre-petition lenders.
The legal standing for this argument is derived from Section 105(a) of the bankruptcy
code. This section provides that the court may issue orders “necessary” to carry out the

209 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).

210

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)
211

79

provisions of the bankruptcy code. 212 There are no statutorily prescribed standards dealing
with when substantive consolidation is allowed.
The two factors courts usually rely on in determining the allowance of substantive
consolidation are (1) whether the creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit
and did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit and (2) whether the affairs of
the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors. 213
In Kmart’s case, the unsecured creditors argued that Kmart met the test for the first
factor. Kmart, through its corporate department, provided services to all Kmart entities. 214
As a collective whole, the pre-petition lenders held most of the pre-petition, impaired,
unsecured claims against the Kmart of subsidiaries. The unsecured creditors asserted that
they were entitled to substantially all the value in Kmart’s subsidiaries. As a result, they
argued that the other creditors of Kmart, including trade vendors and other unsecured
creditors, should not be distributed any value from the Kmart of subsidiaries until the prepetition lenders were paid in full. 215
On the other hand, Kmart argued that the creditors did not deal with the Kmart
entities as a single economic unit.
212

Rather, the pre-petition lenders obtained separate

11 U.S.C. §105, A second well can be drawn from section 1123(a)(5)(C).

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 71 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL)

213

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 72 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL). These services included accounting and bookkeeping, treasury, legal, tax, informational systems,
administrative, real estate management, store planning, construction and design, human resources administration,
“back office” corporate services and shared a centralized cash management system. Id.
214

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 72 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
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subsidiaries guarantees from each Kmart subsidiary. Further, the separate entities had their
own real estate, executory contracts, and inventory. 216
On the second prong of the test, the unsecured creditors committee argued that
historically Kmart filed consolidated financial statements. Moreover, Kmart’s corporate
department provided service to all Kmart entities including accounting, bookkeeping,
treasury, legal, tax, information systems, administrative, real estate management, store
planning, construction and design, human resource administration, and similar “back office”
corporate services. The entities also share a centralized cash management system.
On the flip side, Kmart could have argued that not all creditors dealt with the Kmart
entities as a single economic unit-prepetition lenders obtained separate subsidiary guarantees
from each subsidiary. Furthermore, each subsidiary has separate real estate leases and
executory contracts, and each owns its own real estate and inventory. Alternatively, Kmart
could argue that substantive consolidation was not in the best interest of all creditors,
eliminating it as an option. 217
iii.

Preference Claims

As a general matter, a “preference” under the bankruptcy code is a payment made by
a debtor to a creditor within the 90 days prior to the petition date if the payment is on
account of a pre-existing debt owed by the debtor to the creditor. Kmart made over $1

216 Id.In fact, the pre-petition lenders could argue that substantive consolidation would harm them. The pre-petition
lenders would have only one claim against the consolidated pool of assets, and their anticipated recovery on that single
claim would be diluted by claims of all other unsecured creditors. Because some pre-petition lenders would receive
less for their claims due to substantive consolidation, Kmart argued that consolidation was not in the best interests
of all creditors.

This is because if the entities were substantively consolidated, the subsidiary guarantees would be eliminated, and the
prepetition lenders’ asserted priority entitlement to the subsidiaries would be lost. Furthermore, the claims would be
diluted by the claims of all other unsecured creditors.
217
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billion preference payment to Fleming, $422 million on taxes; over $410 million in real estate
payments, $8. 3 million in intercompany loans among affiliates; $2.2 billion in payments to
pre-petition lenders on loan pay downs; $106 million in interest on pre-petition notes $248
million to Kmart’s joint venture partners; and $108 million in employee benefit payments
(not including payroll).

218

As a general matter, if creditor provides a debtor with “new value” after the creditor
has received a payment from the debtor and the new value remains unpaid as of the petition
date, it can be deducted from the amount of the new value from the previous preferential
transfer. Similarly, payments are made by a debtor on account of goods and services
acquired in the “ordinary course” of business; they may be exempt from recovery by a
debtor under the preference statutes. 219
Kmart identified all transfers made by them to all persons within the 90-day
preference period. Based on this analysis, approximately $6 billion in preferential payments
could be subject to recovery under the bankruptcy code. 220 Of the $6 billion in claims,
approximately $1.86 could be classified as “new value.” Additionally, $2.18 billion could be
classified under the “ordinary course” umbrella. The remaining $2 billion fall outside both
categories.
Asserting the “ordinary course” defense requires an intensive fact-based analysis that
is polycentric and involves nebulas facts. Because of this, the defense and successful claim is
Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 103, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).
219 Id.
220 This amount does not include preferential amounts made to trade vendors and service providers.
218
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highly uncertain, very risky, and expensive to litigate. There is also the possibility that the
Debtors were insolvent at the time of alleged preferential payments were made.
After applying the estimated costs of litigation, and the risks involved in such
litigation, the Debtors estimate that the potential recovery would range from $240 million
and $405 million. 221
iv.

Trust Claims

The bankruptcy code permits a court to appoint a trustee under section 1104(a) of
the bankruptcy code. 222 The UST must move for the appointment of a trustee if there are
reasonable grounds to suspect that parties have participated in fraud or dishonest conduct. 223
Also, the appointment of a trustee can be appointed on “request of a party in interest.” 224 In
the Kmart case, a trustee was appointed by the court to investigate the mismanagement and
fraud committed by the company’s senior management. 225

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 104 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
222 Appointment may be “for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of
the debtor” or “if such appointment is in the best interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interest
of the estate” or if grounds exist to convert or dismiss the case under §1112, but the court determines that the
appointment of the trustee or examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.
223 11 U.S.C. §1104(e).
224 “If the court does order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then any time before the confirmation of a
plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States Trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order
the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an
investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonest, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the
management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor if (1) such appointment is
in the interests of the creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed,
liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.”
11. U.S.C. §1104(c).
225 The members accused of fraud were fired and no longer employed by Kmart when the investigations were taking
place.
221
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The Debtors admitted that evidence indicates that the estates have claims against
former officers on grounds that they were grossly derelict in performing their duties to the
company, its associates, vendors, and investors, for claims such as breach of fiduciary duties
of due care, loyalty and candor, gross negligence, and certain bankruptcy-related causes of
action. 226 In addition, management also breached contract and conducted misconduct
against certain third party vendors who purported to provide consulting services to
Kmart. 227 Finally, there are numerous allegations issued against Charles Conway directly. 228

For example, in summer 2001, a senior executive directed initiatives that resulted in the excessive purchase of
inventory without sufficient analysis and oversight, and without appropriate consultation with the merchant community
or Kmart’s treasury officials in the amount of $850 million.
226

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 44 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
227

228 The complaints filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan alleged that Mr.
Conway made material misstatements or omission during the alleged class period that inflated the trading prices of
Kmart’s common stock and seek, damages under section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and section
410 of the Michigan uniform Securities Act. Kmart is not a defendant in this litigation.
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Chapter Fifteen
BEST INTERESTS: KMART’S LIQUIDATION ANALYSIS
Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more
productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
Warren Buffett
Under Section 1129(a)(7) of the bankruptcy code, Kmart was required to prove that
the reorganization was in the best interests of the creditors. Kmart needed to show three
things: (1) the total value of the outstanding claims against Kmart; (2) the value of these
claims if Kmart was liquidated; (3) the value of the claims if Kmart was reorganized. The
purpose of the liquidation analysis is to provide information in order that the bankruptcy
court may determine that the plan of reorganization is in the best interests of all classes of
creditors and equity interest holders impaired by the plan. 229
i.

Outstanding claims

The last date for setting claims against the Debtors’ was July, 31 2002.After this date,
the debtors had a total of 44,935 claims filed against them asserting claims in the total face
amount of $75.2 billion. However, Alix Partners determined that many of these “claims”
were invalid or duplicates. 230

The “best interest test” requires that a bankruptcy court find that the plan provides to each member of each impaired
class a recovery that has a value at least equal to the value of the distribution each member would receive if Kmart
were liquidated under Chapter 7.
229

230 PBGC claims (the government agency that affords certain guarantees of pension plan liabilities) had claims of
almost $41 billion that would not be realized because the Debtors intended to continue paying their pension obligations.
Furthermore, Alix Partners determined that there were$12.4 billion in duplicate claims.
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Vehicle of recovery

$ in millions

No plan or liquidation

$ 75, 200, 000, 000

Plan

$ 8, 000, 000, 000

Liquidation

ii.

$ 18, 000, 000, 000

Value in liquidation

The liquidation value to unsecured creditors is not a simple matter of determine the
aggregate value of the assets. The pie is first reduced by the secured creditors to the extent of
the value of their collateral, including the value of goods delivered on consignment to the
extent this interest is perfected followed by the costs and expenses of liquidation, including
administrative expenses and costs of both the chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases. 231
In a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation of Kmart, Alix Partners estimated that the
total value of the unsecured claims would range from $11.7 billion to $18.2 billion. 232 For
purposes of the analysis, Alix Partners assumed that liquidation would require three phases
and would take place over 18 months. Phase 1 would comprise a three-month period during
which inventories would be sold in a going-out-of-business sale conducted by a third party.
Costs include the compensation of a trustee as well as of counsel and other professionals retained by the trustee, asset
disposition expenses, all unpaid expenses incurred by the debtor in its bankruptcy case that are allowed in the chapter 7
case, litigation costs, and claims arising from the operation of the debtor during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
Second, the liquidation itself would trigger certain priority payments that would otherwise be due in the ordinary course
of business. Finally, the liquidation would trigger the rejection of a large number of executory contracts and unexpired
leases and thereby create a significantly higher number of unsecured claims. However, holders of rights of letter of
credit beneficiaries are generally not affected by liquidation.
231

The difference in amounts will be discussed in the liquidation section. Disclosure Statement with Respect to First
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at
105 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).

232
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By the end of this sale, substantially all store, distribution center, and field associates would
be terminated. Phase 2 would comprise the next six month period and would sell off
Kmart’s real estate. Further, most of the company’s non-real estate fixed assets would be
marketed.

Additionally, headquarter operations would “wind down.”

Phase 3 would

comprise a nine month period after the real estate sale during which any remaining litigation
would be pursued, final tax returns filed, bankruptcy reports and schedules filed and
remaining assets disposed.
The value of Kmart in liquidation fluctuates mainly because of two factors. First, in
the event of liquidation, the aggregate amount of unsecured claims will increase significantly
(as reflected in the high range estimate), and such claims will be subordinated to priority
claims that will be created. 233 Secondly, the assets in liquidation are sold at a forced sale and
therefore are sold at a deep discount.
iii.

Value under plan

The value of Kmart under the plan is approximately $3 billion dollars. 234 The
members of each impaired class would receive at least as much under the plan as they would
in liquidation in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Creditors and interest-holders would
receive a better recovery through the distributions contemplated by the plan because the
continued operations of Kmart as a going concern, would allow for the realization of more
value for Kmart’s assets and reduce claims against the estate. 235
For example, employees would file claims for wages, pensions, and other benefits, some of which will be entitled to
priority. Further, landlords would likely file large claims for both unsecured and priority amounts. The resulting increase
in both general unsecured and priority claims would decrease percentage recoveries to unsecured creditors of Kmart.
234 See chapter 11 for a detailed discussion of the valuation.
235 The assets the estate holds can be valued at their fair market value rather than a discounted rate because of the
forced liquidating sale.
233
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Chapter Sixteen
NEW HORIZONS: APPROVAL OF THE PLAN
Four steps to achievement: Plan purposefully. Prepare prayerfully. Proceed positively. Pursue persistently.
William Arthur Ward
A.

The Plan Proposal

Kmart proposed a global settlement of their claims, embodied by the plan that
affords distributions to their constituencies commensurate with the risks of their litigation
positions. Under section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the bankruptcy code and rule 9019 of the
bankruptcy rules, a settlement, such as the plan, should be approved if it represents a
reasonable compromise that is in the collective best interests of all constituencies in light of
risks of continued litigation. The settlement need not afford the best possible recovery to
any particular constituency, but instead need only represent a recovery that falls within a
reasonable range of litigation possibilities. The necessary creditors and debtors believed the
plan to meet those standards.
B.

Voting

Claimholders and interest holders in each impaired class are entitled to vote in their
respective classes as a class to accept or reject the Plan. Classes 1, 2, and 3 are unimpaired
by the plan. Therefore, under section 1126(f) of the bankruptcy code, they are conclusively
presumed to have accepted the plan. Because all debtors are proponents of the plan, class 8
and 12 are deemed to have accepted the plan. The remaining classes (4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11,
and 12) are impaired. Accordingly, under section 1126(c) of the bankruptcy code, except as

88

provided in 1126(e), an impaired class has accepted the Plan if the Plan is accepted by the
holders of at least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number of the
allowed claims of such class that have timely and properly voted to accept or reject the
plan. 236 Section 1126(d) states that an impaired class of interest has accepted the plan if it is
accepted by at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interest of such class that have
timely and properly voted to accept or reject the plan.
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan can be confirmed even
if it has not been accepted by all impaired classes as long as at least one impaired class of
claims has accepted it.

The court can confirm the plan, at the request of Kmart,

notwithstanding the plan’s deemed rejection by impaired classes so long as it “does not
discriminate unfairly” and is “fair 237 and equitable” 238 to each impaired class that has not
accepted the plan. 239 The votes of holders of subordinated securities claims and interests in
Kmart are not being solicited.

Therefore, they are deemed to have rejected the plan

pursuant to section 1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 11, 2003, Kmart filed the
voting report certifying the method and result of the ballet tabulation for each voting

236

11 U.S.C. 1129(e).

A plan is fair and equitable as to a class of secured claims that rejects the plan if the plan provides (1) that the holder
of claims included in rejecting class retain the liens securing those clams, and (2) that each holder of a claim of such
class receives on account of that claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of that claim, as of
the effective date.
237

238 A plan is fair and equitable as to a class of unsecured claims that rejects the plan if the plan provides (1) for each
holder of a claim included in the rejecting class to receive or retain on account of that claim property that has a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or (2) that the holder of any claim or interest
that is junior to the clams of such rejecting class will not receive or retain on account of such junior claim or interest any
property at all.

A plan does not discriminate unfairly within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code if a dissenting class is treated
equally with respect to other classes of equal rank.
239

89

class. 240 Accordingly, Kmart passed plan pursuant to section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code on April 23, 2003.
C.

Effective Date

On the effective date the plan goes into effect thus triggering several important
events.
i.

Contributions

On the effective date, the Plan Investors will pay Kmart in cash pursuant to the terms
and conditions in the investment agreement.
ii.

Post-effective date financing

On the effective date, Kmart will enter into the exit financing facility agreement in
order to repay the DIP facility claims, make payments required on the effective date, and
conduct their post-reorganization operations. Exit financing is of paramount importance to
any reorganizing plan because every business must have necessary funds to operate. Kmart,
along with their investment banker and financial advisor, Miller Buckfire Lewis, solicited
commitments of $2 billion dollars in exit financing upon terms acceptable to the creditors.
After extensive negotiations, the Debtors agreed to the exit lenders proposal. On January
14, 2003, the Debtors filed a motion requesting authority to accept the commitment letter
and to pay expenses in connection therewith. On January 28, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court
entered an order granting the requested relief. The authorization of the letter and associated
expenses are administrative claims.

240

The only rejecting classes were the deemed rejected classes.
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iii.

Trust preservation

Pursuant to section 1123(b)(3) of the bankruptcy code, Kmart will retain and may
enforce any retained actions pending on the effective date, except those specifically excluded
by the plan.
iv.

Executory contracts and unexpired leases

Unless provided for in article 8.1(c) of the plan, each executory contract and
unexpired lease is deemed automatically assumed in accordance with sections 365 and 1123
of the bankruptcy code. 241
v.

New existence

Perhaps most importantly, Kmart will take all steps necessary to form New Holding
Company and New Operating Company pursuant to their respective certificates of
incorporation and by-laws. 242 Secondly, contribute and transfer all assets of Kmart, other
than qualified real estate and trust assets to entities contemplated by the restructuring
transactions. Finally, issue all of the New Operating Company common stock to New
Holding Company. 243

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 68, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
241

Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 109, In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
242

243 The articles of incorporation and bylaws of New Holding Company will authorize (a) five-hundred million
(500,000,000) shares of New Holding Company Common Stock, $0.01 par value per share; (b) authorize twenty million
(20,000,000) shares of New Holding Company preferred stock for future issuance upon terms designated by the board
of directors of the New Holding Company; (c) provide, pursuant to §1123(a)(6) of the bankruptcy code, provisions
prohibiting the issuance of non-voting equity stock for two years from the effective date, and provisions setting forth
voting power among classes of equity securities possessing voting power.
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Chapter Seventeen
FAIRY TALES: KMART FROM 2003-2010
If you want a happy ending, that depends, of course, on where you stop your story.
Orson Welles
Senior management of Kmart lived the life of rock stars and divas. They had gated
estates, yachts, company jets, and saw their perks, bonuses, and loans increase while their
company reported loss to the tune of $3.9 billion dollars in a mere five quarters. 244 The life
of excess in the lives of rock stars is something that may be strived for in a capitalist society,
but when it corporate America gets in the act, there are real tangible losses. Over 70,000
workers lost their jobs and millions of stock-holders lost their retirement plans because the
actions of Kmart. 245 To understand the effect of the Kmart case, the management, average
Joes, and the Kmart Corporation will be explored.
A.

Executive management

As expected, within 50 days of the Petition date, the debtors replaced almost all
members of senior management. 246 In their wake, several new members were appointed in
their place. 247 Further, the newly appointed board did not crack down on financial payments

Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002.
Karen Dybis, Kmart's woes trickle down: Suppliers, malls and even retailer's hometown suffer along with laid-off
workers, The Detroit News, Feb. 24, 2003.
246 Charles Conway (CEO), Mark Schwartz (President), John McDonald (EVP, CFO), David Rots (CAO) were all
separated from their employment with Kmart by March 11, 2002.
247 James Adamson became (CEO), Ronald Hutchison was named chief restructuring officer, Albert Koch was
appointed (CFO), Edward Stenger was named (treasurer), Julian Day was named (president and COO), Michael Macik
became(EVP of HR), William Underwood was appointed (EVP of sourcing & global operations).
244

245
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to ex-executives. It seems that the board operated under the “good-old-boys” framework
and awarded their former colleges’ golden parachutes despite the rampant allegations of
fraud, deceit, and corruption. The chart below illustrates the payments made. 248

It is significant to note the funds given out were latter limited not by the company, but by
court decree. 249
B.

Average Joes

At the time of the Petition Date, Kmart had over 519 million outstanding shares of
stock that would soon become worth nothing. 250 The stock had already lost over 86% of its
value since the start of the year and was tradingat a 38 year low. 251 The bankruptcy also has
a devastating effect on employees of Kmart. A manager at a Texas store told the Free
Pressthat the company announcement “was devastating, just devastating. It’s just that you’re
never ready.” Employees, he said, were hurt, angry and afraid, “all those emotions that
Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002.
Kmart would have given the executives their negotiated benefits. Only when forced by the creditors were
the payments retracted. Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002.
250 Karen Dybis, Kmart Plan Guts Investors, The Detroit News, Jan. 19, 2003.
251 Rebecca Byrne, Meet the Street: Bankruptcy Not Expected to KO Kmart, The Street, Jan. 23, 2002.
248

249
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come with uncertainty.” 252 By the time Kmart had finished reorganizing, more than 60,000
employees had lost their jobs and 600 stores were closed. 253 The holders of common stock
received no distributions under the plan.
The consequences of a bankruptcy not only affect Kmart directly, but the thousands
of business, municipalities, and employees that depended on Kmart to bring in sales. A
retail consultant said a significant number of former Kmart store locations will remain
vacant for significant periods of time. The resulting decline in shoppers will devastate many
small businesses, and cause strip centers to fold. "Kmart is well-defined as a wrecking crew,
and my position is the wreckage will continue." 254 For example, Penske Auto Centers cut
more than 4,000 employees in April alone because of Kmart’s bankruptcy. 255 Despite debts
to the private sector, Kmart also left behind bills to be passed on to municipalities that will
be doubly hit on the bankruptcy, first because of not receiving the taxes they are owed, and
second in the loss revenue from employees and business operations. For example, the city
of Troy MI, was owed $213,000 in taxes according to city records that remain unpaid. 256

Id.
Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited, Greenhouse Product News, Mar. 2003, at 3.
254 Karen Dybis, Kmart's woes trickle down: Suppliers, malls and even retailer's hometown suffer along with laidoff workers, The Detroit News, Feb. 24, 2003.
255Id.
256 Id.
252
253
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C.

The end of Kmart

In November 2004, Kmart Holdings bought Sears Roebuck for $11 billion dollars
and merged the companies to create Sears Holdings. 257 Sears Holding is the third largest
general merchandise retail company in the United States. The company was formed in 2005
by the merger of Sears Roebuck (Sears) and Kmart Holdings. The merger was coordinated
by Edward Lampert, the current Chairman, whom now holds over 54% of the shares
outstanding through his hedge fund ESL Investments. 258 The idea behind the merger of
Kmart and Sears was to combine the strengths of companies, the reputation for quality and
service of Sears, and the low prices of Kmart. The company generated $44 billion in sales in
2009. 259 Despite the high volume of sales, profits have not followed. The recession that
followed the 2007-08 housing collapse has not been kind to the new company as its sales
decreased 5.1% in 2009 and the company’s net income fell from $1.5 billion in 2006 to a
mere $253 million in 2009. 260 The “Kmart” division of Sears Holdings contributed only
35.7% in sales to Sears Holdings in 2009.
It appears that Kmart’s assets were not properly valued in the reorganization.
Analysts from Deutsche bank conducted an independent analysis and concluded that the real
estate was substantially undervalued. 261 Because of the bankruptcy process, Kmart had an
2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki
Analysis, http://www.wikinvest.com.
258 Parija Bhatnagar, The Kmart-Sears Deal, CNN, Nov. 17, 2004.
259 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki
Analysis, http://www.wikinvest.com.
260 Id.
261[who] Concluded that the stock could be valued as high as $152.95 a share.
257
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average rent of $2.03 per square foot per store while other comparable retailer’s average was
$10.07. 262 Because of the severity of this undervaluation, Kmart sold off its stores piece by
piece thereby receiving maximum value for them. 263 The Deutsche bank report noted that
the department stores were "the mother lode of real estate value." As late of July 2004, it
was still unsure if Kmart would liquidate or try to turn itself around. 264 For example, in June
2004, Kmart sold 78 of its stores to Sears and Home Depot for $965 million. 265
According to its most recent financial statements, Sears Holding is doing well and is
profitable. 266

Id.
2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki Analysis,
http://www.wikinvest.com.
264 Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited, Lawn & Garden Retailer March 2003 Volume: 2 Number: 3.
265 Kmart stock soars with release of analyst report.
266 The company had net-income during the fourth quarter of $474 million and a yearly net-income of $133 million
in 2010. 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\SHLD discussion of KMART.docx.
262
263
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Chapter Eighteen
THE HAND OF JUSTICE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS
If you have ten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the law.
Winston Churchill
On January 22, 2004, the Seventh Circuit heard arguments on Kmart’s critical vendor
motion. The court upheld the order of District Judge Grady, holding that the “critical”
vendors should not have been paid in full for pre-petition claims. 267
A.

Seventh Circuit Opinion

The court noted that, out of approximately 4,330 vendors, Kmart decided that 2,330
of these were “critical.” The critical vendors were paid in full for Kmart’s pre-petition debt.
The other 2,000 vendors, along with 43,000 additional creditors, “eventually received about
10¢ on the dollar, mostly in stock of the reorganized Kmart.” 268
Kmart first argued that by the time Judge Grady reversed the order authorizing
payment, it was too late and the money could not be refunded. However, the Seventh
Circuit noted that “[r]eversing preferential transfers is an ordinary feature of bankruptcy
practice, often continuing under a confirmed plan of reorganization.”

Although debt

incurred through a DIP financing order is not reversible under the bankruptcy code,
“[n]othing comparable anywhere in the Code covers payments made to pre-existing,
unsecured creditors, whether or not the debtor calls them ‘critical.’” 269
267
268

In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir., 2004).
Id. at 869.
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Next, Kmart argued that it relied to its detriment on the original order. The court
held that, although the “critical vendors” continued selling goods and services to Kmart in
exchange for the payment of pre-petition debts, this was not “detrimental reliance.” They were
paid in full for all of the post-petition goods and services that they provided to Kmart – and
so the court found that, although perhaps there was some kind of reliance on the order,
there was no detriment to the vendors. 270
The Seventh Circuit then turned its attention to the asserted authority for the
payment – Section 105(a). “Section 105(a) allows a bankruptcy court to “issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the
Code.” However, the Seventh Circuit held that this section does not give the bankruptcy
court the authority to override the rules of bankruptcy, but rather only to implement them.
Although the “doctrine of necessity” is found in some very old cases, the court found that it
“is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code.” Further, the cases where the
doctrine originated, which were decided in the late 1800’s, predate the first general effort to
codify the rules of bankruptcy. The court dismissed this old caselaw, noting that “[o]lder
doctrines may survive as glosses on ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or later, but not as
freestanding entitlements to trump the text. 271
Regardless of ancient doctrines or any possible interpretation of the code, the
Seventh Circuit found that the critical vendor order was unsound on its face. The premise

Id.
Id. at 869.
271 Id. at 871.
269
270
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of the original order was “the belief that vendors not paid for prior deliveries will refuse to
make new ones.” 272 The court noted:
For the premise to hold true, however, it is necessary to show
not only that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with
reorganization as with liquidation – a demonstration never
attempted in this proceeding – but also that the supposedly
critical vendors would have ceased deliveries if old debts were
left unpaid while the litigation continued.
If vendors will
deliver against a promise of current payment, then a
reorganization can be achieved, and all unsecured creditors will
obtain its benefit, without preferring any of the unsecured
273
creditors.
B.

Critical Commentary

Rather than providing clarity, the Seventh Circuit’s decision resulted in further
confusion regarding the viability of “critical vendor” orders. In April 2004, H. Bradley
Staggs wrote in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal that the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Kmart created “further uncertainty as to a bankruptcy court’s authority to enter a
critical-vendor order.” Although the court shut the door to any attempt to use § 105(a) or
the doctrine of necessity, the court noted in dicta that § 363(b)(1) might provide
authorization if (1) the “critical” vendors would cease providing goods to the debtor without
payment, and (2) the entry of the critical-vendor order is in the best interests of the estate.
Staggs notes that adherence to these requirements might require the debtor, in the first few
days of its bankruptcy, to “present a liquidation analysis to the bankruptcy court that would
reflect a lower percentage recovery for pre-petition creditors (including non-critical vendors)
as compared to the recovery such creditors would receive under a theoretical chapter 11 plan
272
273

Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
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that may eventually be confirmed after the debtor makes payments to critical vendors.” It is
unlikely, he claimed, that a debtor would be able to make this showing. As well, the
comments by the court regarding § 363(b)(1) are just dicta. A vendor relying upon a court’s
grant of critical vendor status under § 363(b)(1) would have no guarantee that the payment
would not be subject to subsequent avoidance. 274
A few months later, in June 2004, commentators were more hopeful for the
resurrection of the critical vendor doctrine. A paper entitled “Down, But Not Out: The
Status off Critical-Vendor Payments Post-Kmart” noted that the Seventh Circuit’s dicta had
already been used to “authorize the full payment of at least one debtor’s pre-petition wage
obligations.” 275 The paper predicted the following effects of the decision: First, debtors
would be limited to only the most critical vendors, and they would need to meet the high
burden of proof of showing that each vendor “has, in fact, threatened to stop supplying
goods unless paid its pre-petition obligations.” Further, “debtors seeking critical vendor
orders should consider providing their non-critical vendors with notice of their critical
vendor motions” to prevent any allegation of insufficient notice. Despite these limitations,
the paper expressed the opinion that the critical vendor doctrine was not “killed” by the
Seventh Circuit: “this decision merely adds a new metaphorical ‘wrinkle’ to a ‘crumpled’
doctrine.

276

274 H. Bradley Staggs, Critical-Vendor Orders: Has the Seventh Circuit Put Such Orders on the Critical List?, 23 Am. Bankr. Inst.
J. 16 (Apr., 2004).
275 SeeIn re Jays Foods L.L.C., Final Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§363(b) & 507(a) (authorizing (1) the payment of prepetition employee obligations and the continuation of employee benefit plans and programs post-petition, and (2)
directing all banks to honor pre-petition checks for payment of employee obligations).
276 James H.M. Sprayregen, James A. Stempel, et al., Down But Not Out: The Status of Critical-Vendor Payments Post-Kmart,
23 A. Bank. Inst. J. 26 (June 2004).
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Chapter Nineteen
FORTUNE COOKIES
Your best teacher is your last mistake.
Ralph Nader
A.

Ride the Waves
Chapter 11 bankruptcies often place all the parties involved on unstable footing. The

Debtor needs to avoid getting pushed over by demands from creditor, creditors need to
compromise to maximize the value of the estate, and the legal system attempts to establish
just remedies. Just like in surfing, a debtor has to find a big wave and ride it out to the end.
The surfer has to have skill, knowledge, and speed to make it until the end or otherwise face
a wipeout.
Kmart did not know how it would compete with Wal-Mart or Target but knew that it
could survive by focusing on its premium brands. Kmart’s plan was to exit bankruptcy as
soon as possible and become a thinner company by cutting stores and employees. As long
as the company does not get pushed over and keeps going, it should be ok.
B.

Have a good publicist
A company usually enters chapter 11 because they have made some mistakes along

the way. When talking in front of a judge or creditors it is important to focus on what the
company did right and how they plan to do better in the future. Kmart did not state that its
board had no control over its CEO and COO, or had no plan to compete with Wal-Mart,
and Target. Instead it focused on acknowledging isolated incidents of bad judgment and
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suggested ways to avoid the situation in the future. Kmart presented itself as a wiser
company who learned from its mistakes to the creditors, judge, and public.
C.

Don’t make assumptions
As noted above, JDA was denied an administrative claim even though it performed

post-petition services requested by Kmart. The teaching of this ruling is that vendors cannot
assume that post-petition work completed for debtors will receive administrative status.
“Depending on the circumstances, a cautious vendor might want to proceed on the
assumption that administrative claim status will not be available.” 277
A vendor in this situation has several options. First, they may “request a payment
method such as payment in advance or payment upon delivery or seek to secure the debtor’s
payment obligations through a letter of credit.” For instance, “JDA could have insisted that
Kmart post a deposit with JDA or arrange for the issuance of a letter of credit in favor of
JDA or a guarantee of payment from a credit-worthy third party.” 278 Second, a vendor may
force the debtor to assume the pre-petition contract before performing any work. This
would protect the defendant from being left with a “a low-priority pre-petition general
unsecured claim for its damages from the debtor’s rejection or cancellation of the
contract.” 279 Regardless of the structure of the post-petition transaction, a creditor should
be careful, as a transfer might be viewed as an unauthorized transfer of property subject to

277 Joseph Cioffi, Protections For Vendors in a Customer’s Bankruptcy May Not Be As Expected, The Metroplitan Corporate
Counsel, June 2004.
278 Bruce S. Nathan, Trade Creditors Beware: Providing Post-Petition Goods and Services to a Chapter 11 Debtor Under a PrePetition Contract Without Protection Can Be Toxic to Collectibility, Business Credit, September 2003.
279 Bruce S. Nathan, Trade Creditors Beware: Providing Post-Petition Goods and Services to a Chapter 11 Debtor Under a PrePetition Contract Without Protection Can Be Toxic to Collectibility, Business Credit, September 2003.
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avoidance under 11 U.S.C. §549. In any case, it might be wise for a vendor to seek explicit
permission from the bankruptcy court before performing any services post-petition. 280
D.

Know your jurisdiction: Kmart’s effect on the critical vendor motion
Although some commentators predicted an end to the critical vendor doctrine, these

dire predictions have not come to pass. Mark A. McDermott, 281 one of the lawyers who
represented Kmart, noted in late 2006 that predictions of a possible end to the doctrine were
“overdrawn.” “In fact, the Kmart decision is the only court of appeals ruling that clearly
delineates, albeit in dictum, the circumstances under which payments may be made to prepetition creditors outside the context of a plan.” At the end of 2006, the positions of the
Circuit Courts with regard to critical vendor orders were as follows:
• First Circuit – no published decisions;
• Second Circuit – debtors may honor pre-petition obligations outside the context of a
plan if necessary to the reorganization; 282
• Third Circuit – debtors may honor pre-petition obligations outside the context of a
plan if necessary to the reorganization; 283
• Fourth Circuit – court of appeals held that § 105(a) affords no authority for a debtor
to pay pre-petition claims prior to plan confirmation; 284
Joseph Cioffi, Protections For Vendors in a Customer’s Bankruptcy May Not Be As Expected, The Metroplitan Corporate
Counsel, June 2004.
281 See Cast of Characters. McDermott, among others, filed Kmart’s critical vendor motion, and may not be an unbiased
source of information on this topic.
282 Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945) (granting priority status to supply creditors where services or goods
were necessary to ensure continued operation of hotel).
283 In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (authorizing payment to creditors under “necessity
of payment” doctrine where payment “is in the interest of all parties ... [and] will facilitate the continued operation of the
railroad”).
280
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• Fifth Circuit – court of appeals has weakened the use of § 105(a) for the payment of
pre-petition claims, but the lower courts have authorized payment under §§105(a),
362(A), 363(b), 1107, and 1108; 285
• Sixth Circuit – pre-plan payments may be made under § 105(a) and the “necessity of
payment” rule; 286
• Seventh Circuit – Kmart controls;
• Eight Circuit – pre-plan payments may be made under the Code; 287
• Ninth Circuit – conflicting rulings; 288
• Tenth Circuit – no published decisions; and
• Eleventh Circuit - § 105(a) may not be used to alter the priority scheme, but some
lower court decisions conflict. 289

284 See In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (declaring pre-petition payment could be justified if in
the best interests of both debtor and creditors); but see In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986)
(reversing decision authorizing pre-petition payment because it would subordinate remaining unsecured creditors'
claims absent requisite inequitable conduct on part of creditors).

See Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne& Assocs. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing
Bankruptcy Code did not give bankruptcy courts authority to debtor to use post-petition funds to satisfy pre-petition
claims); but see In re CEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (permitting pre-petition payment of wage
claims to necessary employees under section 105 and section 507(a)(3) and (4));
285

See In re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991)(“A general practice has developed ...
where bankruptcy courts permit the payment of certain pre-petition claims, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105, where the
debtor will be unable to reorganize without such payment.”).

286

See In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 544-45, 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001)(citing section 364(b) of Bankruptcy
Code as basis for approving debtor's lending transactions in addition to authorizing debtor to pay its critical lumber
vendors' prepetition claims).
287

288 See Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that goal of
debtor rehabilitation may warrant overriding Code's general policy of equality of creditor treatment, thereby justifying
payment of “pre-petition wages to key employees” and “debts to providers of unique and irreplaceable supplies”); but
see B&W Enters., Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting notion
that pre-petition critical vendors could be paid pursuant to necessity of payment rule).
289

Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating cross

collateralization is inconsistent with priority scheme of Bankruptcy Code).
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Even in the presence of favorable caselaw, however, debtors may face difficult
standards if they want to request the payment of “critical vendors” in their first day motions.
Debtors generally must affirmatively prove that there are “no realistic alternatives to
payment of the claims and that absent payment, the estate’s value will be seriously and
substantially jeopardized. The possibility of favorable trade terms will not, by itself, satisfy
this standard.” 290 However, the Bankruptcy Code may provide some support for payment
of pre-petition claims. The act provides that “any claim for the value of goods received by a
debtor in the ordinary course of business within twenty days prior to commencement of its
case will be entitled to administrative expense priority status, rather than just general
unsecured status.” This may allow debtors who want to pay pre-petition vendor claims an
opportunity to do so if they pertain to goods delivered twenty days before the case
commenced. 291

Mark A. McDermott, Critical Vendor and Related Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 14 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 409 (Winter 2006).
291 Id.
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